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Why are emotions important, above and beyond correct evalua-
tions? ... We might want to reply, simply, that having emotions 
is an essential part of being human. Yet even if having an emo-
tional texture is essential to being human, the question of why we 
should prize emotions still would arise. Why should we espe-
cially prize being human, if that is what it is, unless it embodies 
something that objectively merits being prized? We don't have to 
prize every trait we have; why then should the fact that the trait 
is part of our essence make a significant difference? We need to 
investigate further the special value of having emotions. 
-Robert Nozickl 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the kitchen. At the water cooler. Behind the bench. In the 
war room. People parse the deluge of input with sight. Through 
sound. By touch, taste, smell. And feeling. 
Feeling - emotionality - is the sixth sense, the sixth critical 
human filter through which we make sense of the universe. It is an 
epistemological axiom: without the information gleaned from the 
emotional sense that imbues human interaction and institutions with 
meaning, our world would seem reduced to hollow shells and ran-
domly-acting forms. We wouJd see a lost child and not understand 
why she is crying; we might hear a quiver in the voice of another and 
neither imagine the cause nor foresee its impact on his immediate 
behavior. Without recourse to our vast emotional database, we would 
tumble helplessly into the yawning gaps left open by language. In a 
meeting with new clients, we could never grasp the full essence of 
their need. In a divisive summit over historically disputed political 
boundaries, we would be utterly lost. 
So long as human beings lead emotional lives, we depend on the 
data emotional sense provides to understand what is casting the 
shadows that we observe in the physical form of human actions. It is 
our telescope into the black box of human agency, behavior, and cau-
sation. It is the way we understand, evaluate, and hypothesize about 
other people's emotional experience of the world and the way we con-
sult our own oracle. Navigating the human landscape without this 
sixth sense would be like studying a sphere in two dimensional space. 
So why do we ask lawyers to pretend otherwise? 
1. Robert Nozick, Emotions, in THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITA-
TIONS 87, 90 (1989). 
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We hardly need reminding that emotionality is a defining human 
characteristic, and emotional sense proves just as universal. Differ-
ent cultural groups emote differently, and emphasize its proper role 
and reliability in different ways. 2 Yet nobody is entirely without 
emotional sense,3 partially acknowledged as "sensitivity," "intuition," 
or "emotional intelligence," and which this piece broadly defines as 
the mental manipulation of affective data.4 Affective data -like the 
crying child and quivering voice - stimulate complex psychological 
(and occasionally physiological) reactions in people,5 but do not so in-
spire machines. Indeed, as the technological world mimics more and 
more the abilities of the biological, emotionality remains the distinc-
tive hallmark of humanity. Artificial intelligence has produced 
chess-playing machines that can reason analytically, and mechanical 
devices have been designed to gather data akin to that perceived by 
the first five senses -but thus far, emotional sense has proved be-
yond the reach of engineering. To deny the salience of emotionality 
in fields we generally consider realms of reason - foremost among 
them the law - would be tantamount to entrusting our most pivotal 
societal institutions to the care of robots. 
2. See Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Nalini Ambady, Universals and Cultural Dif-
ferences in Recognizing Emotions, 12 CuRRENT DIRECTIONS IN PsYCHOL. Scr. 159 
(2003) (finding some universals but significant enough differences between cultural 
expressions of emotion to yield an in-group advantage for evaluating emotional con-
tent in social interactions), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/anger/Cur-
rentDirections.pdf; Sieghard Beller & Andrea Bender, Cultural Differences in the 
Cognition and Emotion of Conditional Promises and Threats - Comparing Germany 
and Tonga, Department of Psychology, University of Freiburg, D-79085 (exploring 
different cultural groups' emotional responses to verbalized conditional promises and 
threats), available at http://www.cogsci.northwestern.edu/cogsci2004/papers/pa-
per309.pdf; Kynug Il Kim & Arthur B. Markman, Fear of Isolation, Cultural Differ-
ences, and Recognition Memory, Department of Psychology, University of Texas, 
Austin (demonstrating distinct cultural groups' varying sensitivity to context infor-
mation based on distinct cultural fears), available at http://www.cogsci.northwestem. 
edu/cogsci2004/papers/paper 125. pdf. 
3. That is to say, no one with a healthy brain lacks emotional sense. Scientists 
have, however, studied brain-damaged and autistic individuals who lack normal 
human abilities to evaluate the emotional content of human social intercourse, includ-
ing that perceived in facial expressions and tones of voice. See Ralph Adolphs, Neural 
Systems for Recognizing Emotion, 12 CuRRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 169 (2002); 
Ralph Adolphs et al., A Role for Somatosensory Cortices in the Visual Recognition of 
Emotion as Revealed by Three-Dimensional Lesion Mapping, 20 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 
2683 (2000), available at http://www.medicine.uiowa.edu/adolphs/jn.pdf; S. B. 
Hamann & Ralph Adolphs, Normal Recognition of Emotional Similarity Between Fa-
cial Expressions Following Bilateral Amygdala Damage, 37 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1135 
(1999), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?CMD=display& 
DB=pubmed. 
4. See infra Part II (defining emotional sense in more depth). 
5. See, e.g., Nozick, supra note 1, at 91. 
234 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 10:231 
Few would advocate that we so empower the robot, but many 
nevertheless resist the idea that emotionality is a critical component 
of reasonable, rational decisionmaking.6 Lawyers (in whose hands 
we have entrusted our most pivotal societal institutions) are espe-
cially resistant to the idea that their reasoning should ever be 
"clouded" by emotion. 7 Our societal tendency to undervalue emo-
tional sense as a tool of epistemology follows from the millennia over 
which Western thinkers have imposed a value-laden dichotomy be-
tween cognition and emotion, casting cognition as the virtuous cham-
pion of objective truth and emotion as an amoral, primitive 
wilderness to be tamed by reason.8 But solid legal decisionmaking 
calls for the most careful of consideration, and the resulting repres-
sion of emotionality in deliberation can dull the edge with which law-
yers think about the problems they are asked to solve. 
Indeed, lawyers are routinely asked to negotiate the vexing, 
layered, and often emotionally-charged problems that others have fi-
nally relinquished to the care of professionals. Much of the stuff of 
these problems can be articulated in terms of common law rights and 
duties, statutory rules and remedies, costs and benefits, profits and 
losses. But within the pores of these dispassionate analyses lurk the 
lost child and the quivering voice, the full scope of the client's need 
and history-fed bitterness over disputed boundaries. In contemplat-
ing the root cause and ricocheted effects of legal problems, and in 
managing the matrices of human interaction that arise in negotiated 
attempts to solve them, lawyers rely on an inductive process of know-
ing that is driven as much by emotional sense as it is by more dispas-
sionate logics. 
As this piece sets forth, emotional sense fuels a pre-linguistic, 
quasi-inductive reasoning process -an inner-deliberation that runs 
beneath conscious thought -that enables each of us to draw on stored 
6. See, e.g., Jim Camp, Can Women Be Great Negotiators? As Long as They Keep 
Their Emotions Under Control, http://www.career-intelligence.com/managemenU 
GreatNegotiators.asp (last visited July 29, 2004) (arguing that both men and women 
are made vulnerable by emotionality in negotiation settings). 
7. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence 
of Harry Blackmun, THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 2, 1994, at 13 (critiquing Justice Black-
mun's jurisprudence for relying too heavily on emotional input). See also Samuel 
Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 
CoRNELL L. REv. 655 (1989) (arguing that lawyers inappropriately suppress acknowl-
edgement of emotional inputs to evaluation and decisionmaking). 
8. This philosophical legacy is often attributed to Plato's metaphysics, discussed 
infra Part III. See also Pillsbury, supra note 7, at 674 (discussing how the law's "gen-
eral distrust of emotions" stems from the philosophic tradition that contrasts reason 
with emotion). 
Spring 2005] The Discourse Beneath 235 
information about emotional phenomena to hypothesize about mo-
tives, behavior, and consequences, both within ourselves and in 
others.9 The deliberative use of emotional sense depends on the 
thinker's own experience of emotions, but it is a separate, more com-
plex mental phenomenon than the direct experience of a particular 
emotional state. 10 Epistemologically stated, it is the process by 
which emotionally resonant knowledge is drawn upon to help organ-
ize the chaos of raw input into a state of resolve that can then be 
operated on by more formal inductive reasoning.11 The raw data re-
quiring such pre-treatment arises from a thinker's consideration of 
virtually anything having to do with human experience. 
For lawyers, the final destination of virtually all individual delib-
eration is collective deliberation. In lawyering, the thinker deliber-
ates in service of a larger endeavor (a dispute, a lawsuit, a 
transaction, a legislative proposal), which invariably involves deci-
sionmaking by at least one other person (at minimum, the client). 
Collective deliberation is, of course, the most basic form of negotia-
tion, and be it preparing for litigation, conducting a private settle-
ment hearing, or addressing the Senate - it is the currency of legal 
practice. Most broadly understood as the interactive communication 
process that takes place "whenever we want something from someone 
else or another person wants something from us,"12 negotiation in-
cludes not only the more overt episodes of deal-making but also the 
exchanges in which we want someone to understand or agree with us, 
or we want to understand someone else. Every client contact, partner 
meeting, and strategy session draws on the same negotiating skills 
that a lawyer brings to the more recognized negotiating forum of the 
settlement conference, 13 and the importance of negotiation in policy-
making arenas is self-evident.14 
9. See infra Part II. 
10. See infra p. 16. 
11. See id. 
12. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR 
REASONABLE PEOPLE 6 (1999). Shell further observes that "All of us negotiate many 
times a day. We negotiated as children for things we wanted: attention, special 
treats, and raises to our weekly allowance of spending money. We negotiate as adults 
for much more complex sets of desires that, when you examine them closely, often 
come down to the same things we negotiated for as children. Negotiation is a basic, 
special form of human communication, but we are not always aware that we are doing 
it."). ld. 
13. See generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO 
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 3 (2000) ("Negotiation is central to lawyering, 
and ... lawyers play a critical role in many of society's negotiations."). 
14. Cf. RoGER FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CoNFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969) (treating 
the role of negotiation in resolving international conflict). 
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Having set forth the baseline of emotionally-informed knowing 
that facilitates individual deliberation, the piece then explores how 
emotionally-derived knowledge sustains collective deliberation. As 
deliberation moves from the individual to the collective endeavor, de-
liberators draw on epistemological emotionality both substantively 
and procedurally, not only in honing private deliberations, but also 
through the iterated process by which parties evaluate and adjust for 
the impacts of each round of exchange on participants to maintain 
effective learning and communication between parties. This looped 
consultation of emotional sense, in which parties explore and adjust 
to one another's emotional vocabularies and the emotional data con-
veyed, gives rise to an ever-present, subterranean discourse that un-
derlies collective deliberation - an unspoken negotiation of emotional 
content that runs beneath the surface of the overall deliberative 
endeavor. 
Although negotiators are increasingly exhorted to appreciate the 
impact of raw emotions at the table, this piece goes further in arguing 
that lawyers and negotiators should become aware of the epistemo-
logical function of emotionality. When negotiators better understand 
the way in which emotional knowing informs their practice, they can 
more effectively channel it -harvesting insight where emotional wis-
dom is most strong and containing judgment distortion where emo-
tional wisdom is weakest, facilitating the search for the Pareto 
frontier. 15 
Epistemological emotionality thus fuels the process of individual 
and collective deliberation that permeates legal practice, but negoti-
ating lawyers are discouraged from refining (or even acknowledging) 
their use of emotional knowledge by a professional culture that 
disdains it. Lawyers prefer to see themselves as keenly rational 
thinkers, and negotiators as practitioners of a science with hard 
skills and identifiable principles. And indeed, fine lawyers are 
rational thinkers and good negotiators do engage in a highly struc-
tured practice - but these disciplines coexist with, rather than sup-
plant, their continuous appeal to emotionally-derived wisdom in 
understanding human variables. Modern scholars of philosophy, 16 
15. The Pareto frontier defines that set of potential outcomes in which no interest 
can be further advanced without compromising satisfaction of another. See, e.g., 
JoHN BLACK, OXFORD DICTIONARY oF EcoNOMICS 343 (2000) (defining the concept of 
Pareto-optimality). 
16. See, e.g., PETER GoLDIE, THE EMOTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 
(2000); PATRICIA GREENSPAN, EMOTION~ AND REASON: AN INQUIRY INTO EMOTIONAL 
JUSTIFICATION (1988); ANTHONY liATZIMOYSIS, PHILOSOPHY AND THE EMOTIONS (2003); 
RoNALD DE SousA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION (1987); Nozick, supra note 1. 
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psychology,17 organizations,18 business,19 education,20 and even 
neuroscience21 are increasingly cognizant of the fruits of emotional 
wisdom, and interest in the subject has even arisen in circles of legal 
academia.22 This growing recognition attests to the importance of 
emotional knowing in all aspects of reasoned human discourse - and 
nowhere is reasoned human discourse more important than in the 
deliberative enterprise of law, which requires its agents to reflect 
carefully about the meaning of social interactions and institutions, 
and accords great significance to their resulting choices. 
In legal arenas, the epistemological value of emotional insight is 
pivotal, as lawyers, judges, and policymakers consult emotional data 
in evaluating facts, understanding arguments, formulating propos-
als, and negotiating resolutions. The stakes for solid individual and 
collective deliberation could not be higher. Yet most continue to prac-
tice as though acknowledging emotionality in legal discourse 
17. See, e.g., REUVEN BAR-ON & JAMES A. PARKER, THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE: THEORY, DEVELOPMENT, AssESSMENT, AND APPLICATION AT ScHOOL AND 
IN THE WoRKPLACE (2000). 
18. See, e.g., CARY CHERNISS ET AL., THE EMOTIONALLY INTELLIGENT WORKPLACE: 
How TO SELECT FOR, MEASURE, AND IMPROVE EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN INDIVIDU· 
ALS, GROUPS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (2001); STEPHEN FINEMAN, Emotion in Organization 
(1993). 
19. See, e.g., DANIEL GoLEMAN ET AL., PRIMAL LEADERSHIP: REALIZING THE PoWER 
oF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (2002); Leigh L. Thompson et al., Some Like it Hot: The 
Case for the Emotional Negotiator, in SHARED CoGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE 
MANAGEMENT oF KNowLEDGE (Leigh Thompson et al. eds., 1999); Leigh L. Thompson, 
Relationships and Emotion: Building Rapport, in THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGO· 
TIATOR 168 (Leigh Thompson ed., 1997). 
20. See, e.g., PETER SHARP, NURTURING EMOTIONAL LITERACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
FOR TEACHERS, PARENTS AND THOSE IN THE CARING PRoFESSIONS (2001). 
21. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND 
THE HUMAN BRAIN (1995). 
22. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emo-
tion in Criminal Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269 (1996) (tracing the impact of emotional-
ity in substantive doctrines of criminal law and arguing that legal doctrines 
structured to reflect "evaluative" emotionality can promote the intended purposes of 
criminal law); Pillsbury, supra note 7 (arguing lawyers inappropriately suppresses 
acknowledgement of emotional inputs to evaluation and decisionmaking); Eric A. Pos-
ner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEo. L.J. 1977 (2001) (injecting emotionality into con-
sumer choice theory); Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept, 
40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 195 (2004); Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric 
and Emotion in Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 193 (2002); Cass 
Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and the Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61 
(2002) (arguing that emotional responses unduly trump probability analysis in risk 
assessment); R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 34 
LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 429 (2003) (analyzing legal protection of emotional expression). See 
also 2000 Symposium on Law, Psychology, and the Emotions, 74 CHICAGO-KENT L. 
REv. 1423 et seq. (2000). 
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represents a betrayal of the profession. 23 As courts remain clogged 
with lawsuits, as legal disputants increasingly seek negotiated out-
comes through alternative dispute resolution, 24 and as critical inter-
national deliberations risk derailing over emotionally-charged 
content and culturally distinct approaches25 -clients, constituents, 
and lawyers themselves deserve a fuller model of legal thinking.26 
This article thus sets forth the foundational role of epistemologi-
cal emotionality in legal deliberation and negotiation - the fruits, 
perils, changing cultural norms, and change that remains needed in a 
world where all lawyers negotiate27 and all negotiators deliberate. 
Although we seldom acknowledge the tacit negotiation of affective 
undercurrents that underlie individual and collective deliberation, it 
is only by recognizing its emotional content and better synthesizing 
emotional and analytical responses to negotiating stimuli that we can 
advance our skills to the next level. As lawyers on behalf of our cli-
ents, leaders for our constituents, or advocates for our cause, we 
should strive to meet this challenge, not only to improve any given 
outcome, but to fulfill the true potential of problem-solving negotia-
tion as a socially constructive tool of law and public policy. 
Part II articulates the concept of "emotional sense" and outlines 
its role in the Deliberation Beneath, the pre-analytic process through 
which a thinker pre-screens cognitive inputs by evaluating affective 
characteristics against a learned database of emotional experience. 
23. See, e.g., Melissa Nelken, Negotiation and Psychoanalysis: If I'd Wanted to 
Learn About Feelings, I Wouldn't Have Gone to Law School, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 420, 
427 (1996) (describing the unemotional professional ideal oflawyering and the shame 
that lawyers feel when they depart from this ideal). See also Dwight Golann & He-
laine Golann, Why is it Hard for Lawyers to Deal with Emotional Issues?, 9 DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003, at 26 (quoting a typical lawyerly reflection: "[t)he fact is, I 
sometimes don't feel that I'm being professional when I work with emotions. It's not 
what lawyers do .... Dealing with facts and arguments, analyzing issues, generating 
strategies, and most important, solving problems [is what makes me feel 
professional.]"). 
24. See Erin Ryan, ADR, the Judiciary, and Justice: Coming to Terms with the 
Alternatives, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1851, 1852 (2000) (reviewing the rise of negotiated 
settlement as the primary means of legal dispute resolution). 
25. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 14; RoGER FisHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PAT-
TON, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 30 (Penguin 
Books 1991) (1981). (observing how Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over even the 
most practical matters, such as water distribution, are permeated by strong tides of 
emotion that can destabilize progress). 
26. Anecdotal evidence suggests that nonlawyer negotiators have already been 
learning better, prompting one legal commentator to urge lawyers to improve their 
emotional skills so as to protect their market share. See Lawrence R. Richard, Hiring 
Emotionally Intelligent Associates, 43-0CT REs GESTAE 24, 28. 
27. See MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 3. 
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The Deliberation Beneath may proceed unnoticed beneath the sur-
face level of analysis that attracts greater conscious scrutiny, but it 
provides essential resources for the deliberative stages that follow. 
Part III reviews the traditional segregation of emotion and cogni-
tion in Western thought, how this has created a legal culture that 
disparages open consideration of emotional input, and how scholars 
have increasingly rejected the paradigm that subordinates emotion-
ally-derived knowledge. 
Part IV uncovers the Negotiation Beneath, the subterranean ex-
change of emotional information between individuals that facilitates 
a substantive negotiation. In the Negotiation Beneath, the process of 
emotionally-informed individual deliberation identified in Part II ex-
pands in settings of collective deliberation into an iterated process of 
cross-emotional reflection within and between participants. It re-
views how concepts of emotional sense elucidate notions of negotiat-
ing "intuition" and cognitive biases that threaten negotiating 
efficiency, concluding with reflections from neurobiology on the adap-
tive value of emotional sense. 
Part V concludes the piece by recommending that a more pur-
poseful synthesis of emotional and analytic data in deliberation and 
negotiation will improve the potency with which lawyers, judges, and 
lawmakers approach the problems they are called upon to solve. 
II. THE DELIBERATION BENEATH 
At a more complex level, emotions are experiences. They are the 
feelings that accompany the emergent actions that address the 
anticipated futures of gain or loss in one's attachments to others, 
one's livelihood and safety, and the perceived possibility or im-
possibility of changing the world to one's liking or advantage: 
joy, grief, fear, rage, hope and despair. Though we associate 
them with objects in the world, these feelings, which philoso-
phers call qualia, are internally derived and do not belong to 
those objects, such as the sweetness of fruit, the repugnance of 
carrion, the inviting softness of velvet, and so on. 
-Walter J. Freeman2 B 
28. Walter J. Freeman, Emotion is Essential to All Intentional Behaviors, in EMo-
TION, DEVELOPMENT, AND SELF-ORGANIZATION: DYNAMIC SYSTEMS APPROACHES TO 
EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 209 (Marc D. Lewis & Isabel Granic eds., 1998), available 
at http://sulcus.berkeley.edu/wjf/CE. %20N eurodynamics.and.Emotion. pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 23, 2005). 
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Commonly understood, deliberation refers to the activity of care-
ful consideration, the manufacture of mature reflection by examining 
and weighing the reasons for and against a particular course of ac-
tion. 29 This article probes the importance of emotional inputs to de-
liberation both by groups and within individuals, with special 
attention to deliberation in lawyering, the most deliberative of all 
professions. 
By profession, lawyers are perhaps also the least "emotional" -
setting the stage for the epistemological dilemma that is the subject 
of this inquiry. If, as argued here, epistemological emotionality is an 
underappreciated but critical component of legal deliberation and ne-
gotiation, and lawyers are educated amidst a professional culture 
that disparages emotional inputs to decisionmaking, just how dis-
abled are most lawyers jn performing their essential tasks? Stated 
better, how much more able will lawyers become when they are 
trained to develop their emotional resources rather than expunge 
them? 
As detailed in Part III, the legal culture harbors a deep distrust 
of emotion as tllat inherent human weakness that would, given half 
the chance, wholly undermine reason. Distrust of emotion has been 
successfully inculcated in generations of lawyers, who so fear be-
traying this bedrock professional norm that, on the one hand, they 
shut down channels of emotionally-informed information in circum-
stances where it might genuinely facilitate deliberation. On the other 
hand, they periodically allow their judgment to be unduly swayed by 
the kind of inadequately considered emotional input that really can 
short-circuit the mature deliberative process. Both represent failures 
by the individual to harness innate emotional resources, which can 
aid deliberators in interpreting, forecasting, and managing human 
behaviors within and in others. Fuller understanding leads to richer 
deliberation, which, in turn, leads to more robust decisionmaking. 
Like all human beings, lawyers inevitably rely on emotional sense in 
interpreting their worlds, but they do so in spite of their training 
rather than because ofit. Indeed, it is the lack of self-reflective train-
ing that makes legal deliberators vulnerable to the kind of dysfunc-
tional emotional influence that lawyers most fear. 30 
Lawyers would do better with more honed emotional resources, 
but they have been taught to subjugate the very resources that would 
29. See, e.g., RANDoM HousE WEBSTER's CoLLEGE DICTIONARY 348 (2d ed. 1998). 
30. "Dysfunctional" emotional influence on decisionmaking might be demon-
strated by hasty decisions taken, for example, out of unreflective anger, fear, excite-
ment, vengeance, pride, competition, or exuberance. 
Spring 2005] The Discourse Beneath 241 
help them develop effective lawyer-client partnerships, long-sighted 
public policies, and ethically reflective leadership skills. Ultimately, 
this piece posits that, like other basic legal skills, emotionally-in-
formed deliberation can improve with training, and training begins 
with understanding. This Part explores the emotional contribution 
to individual deliberation that is the foundation for all individual and 
group decisionmaking, and as such, already an inescapable part of 
lawyering. 
A. Emotional Sense as an Epistemological Tool 
In probing the cognitive processes through which deliberators 
evaluate and react to incoming information, this piece often relies on 
the perilous terms, "emotionality" and "emotional sense." The terms 
are useful because we all experience emotions, and most of us proceed 
believing that we basically know what other people are talking about 
when they reference emotion. The terms are perilous because the 
project of actually defining emotion more precisely than that has pre-
occupied human thinkers for at least three thousand years.31 Al-
though it is certainly not my task to resolve that epic ontological 
puzzle here, I will brave the positivist assertion that what is common 
in our collective emotional experience has enough substance that we 
can rely on a colloquial understanding of the word "emotion" to en-
gage a meaningful discussion about its role in deliberation and 
negotiation. 32 
For the purposes of this discussion, then, we need only agree that 
the word "emotions" refers to the subjective experiences most of us 
recognize involving various shades of joy, grief, fear, anger, hatred, 
compassion, envy, hope, guilt, gratitude, disgust, and love.33 We can 
31. See Posner, supra note 22, at 1979 (observing that even now, "psychology 
lacks a widely accepted theory of emotion and many fundamental issues about the 
nature of emotion remain unresolved."). Indeed, a potent critique of scholarship 
about the relationship between emotion and cognition is that "the cognition/emotion 
debate begs the question of what constitutes an emotion." Laura Little, Negotiating 
the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CoRNELL L. REv. 974, 987 (reviewing SusAN 
BANDES, THE PASSIONS OF THE LAw (1999)). 
32. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 22, at 277 (asserting, with regard to the 
ongoing debate about the meanings and mechanisms of emotions, that "there is 
enough common ground and overlap that we are entitled to think of the debate as a 
genuine debate about something reasonably stable ... "). 
33. See id. at 276 (identifying these as the commonly accepted "major emotions"). 
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avoid the pressing psycho-philosophical questions of whether, for ex-
ample, emotions are more physical or more mental phenomena, be-
cause the answers don't alter this analysis very much, if they do so at 
all. 
The more interesting question is what I mean by "emotional 
sense." If visual sense represents the mental manipulation of optical 
data, this piece takes "emotional sense" to be that set of human char-
acteristics that enables the mental manipulation of affective data. 
Admittedly, this definition tempts circularity, since the word "affec-
tive" is defined as "causing emotion or feeling."34 So to rectify any 
such circularity, "affective data" here refers to all incoming informa-
tion that either incites (1) a direct emotional response (such as jeal-
ousy or relieD; or (2) a fast but reflective thought process in which the 
thinker compares the incoming information against an inner 
database of learned information and memories about emotional ex-
periences that the thinker has either experienced directly or observed 
in others (for example, perceiving the crying lost child35 and retriev-
ing internally stored information about fear, helplessness, tears, lost-
ness, childhood, parenting, etc.).3 6 
34. See RANDoM HousE WEBSTER's CoLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 22. 
35. See supra Part I. 
36. Applying the nomenclature of sense to emotion might elicit objection because, 
someone might argue, the conveyance of sensory information suggests a quality of 
objectivity that cannot be present in reference to anything having to do with inher-
ently subjective emotions. However, the predicate notion that sensory information 
conveys unmediated truths about the world is patently illusory. Vision and hearing, 
like emotional sense, require elaborate mental processing to parse relevant informa-
tion from the huge quantities of incoming data that would otherwise overwhelm func-
tional cognition, and to interpose missing material where needed. 
For example, we actually possess two visual blind spots where the optic nerve 
head attaches to the retina of each eye, but we do not perceive these holes in our 
visual field because our brains extrapolate the likely-missing content from the sur-
rounding signals and "fill it in" for us. See, e.g., Seeing More than your Eye Does, at 
http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/bb/blindspotl.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2004). Due to 
the demonstrated cognitive drive to resolve sensory uncertainty, we often perceive 
visual information that is simply not present in the external world or organize visual 
input according to recognizable frames of reference that we choose based on factors 
unrelated to the visual input itself. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hansen, Categori-
cally Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1103, 1189-94 (2004) (demonstrating, through compellingly educational 
illusion samples, how the strong cognitive preference for visual certainty induces peo-
ple to "see" things that are not actually there). From the moment our brains begin 
interpreting sensory data, it becomes "subjectified" by the cognitive filters we apply to 
organize it into recognizable patterns and usable chunks. What we "see" with our 
eyes is thus as much a product of mental manipulation as it is what is actually "out 
there." 
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Though the two variants of affective processing are isolated here 
for the purposes of definition, they are arguably bound together in 
various causal patterns more often than they are separated. We re-
spond emotionally to memories that we retrieve analytically, and a 
direct experience of an emotion may prompt a more analytic consulta-
tion of the emotional database.37 For this reason, affective data may 
arrive from an external source or arise as the product of an indepen-
dent internal thought process.38 
The "mental manipulation" of this affective data occurs as a dis-
cursively inductive enterprise, spanning the subconscious to the 
pseudo-conscious to the intentional, in which the data is processed 
toward one or more responsive ends. For example, on hearing the 
quiver in the voice of another,39 the perceiver first apprehends the 
quiver as affective data, and then reflects, if perhaps instantane-
ously, on distress, composure, resonant past experiences, literature, 
or the like. The perceiver might then consider the origin of the emo-
tion she recognizes in the quiverer, or perhaps how the quiverer's ex-
perience of this emotion may impact his immediate or future 
behavior, or whether it sheds any light on his past acts. This consid-
eration may seem to take place instantaneously, perhaps via a 
nonverbally mediated thought-process, or it may take measurable 
time through a more analytical process ofthought.40 Ultimately, the 
perceiver concludes the process by responding to the data in some 
way based on the fruits of her deliberation - perhaps by soothing, or 
by intentionally choosing to ignore the quiver, or perhaps by choking 
up herself. 
37. See, e.g., Nozick, supra note 1, at 89 ("This does not mean we first are con-
scious of beliefs and evaluations and then have an emotion; sometimes we may dis-
cover our implicit beliefs and evaluations by pondering the emotions we are aware of 
feeling."). 
38. Some would argue that all data becomes potentially "affective" under the sec-
ond variant of affective processing (in which a datum triggers consultation to the in-
ner emotional database), based on the conviction that this process of triggered 
consultation is virtually automatic, taking place unconsciously. See, e.g., Freeman, 
supra note 28, at 5 (describing emotional experience, from the Pragmatic perspective, 
as an "integral part of the ongoing interaction between one's self and one's social 
environment"). 
39. See supra Part I. 
40. The word "analytical" is roughly defined as pertaining to "a proposition that 
is necessarily true independent of fact or experience." See The Free Dictionary. Com 
at www.thefreedictionary.com/analytical (last visited Jan. 7, 2005). For example, "all 
spinsters are unmarried" is an analytical proposition. Id. In this discussion, I use 
"analytical" to refer the sort of logic-mediated reasoning process that operates inde-
pendently of emotional input. 
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Even a seemingly unmediated responsive emotional reaction 
such as the latter involves a (fast) mental manipulation of the affec-
tive data, during which the perceiver recognizes the other party's 
emotion, locates its significance internally, empathizes, and responds 
in kind.41 Indeed, empathy (understood not as sympathy, but as 
"putting on another's shoes" to understand his perspective) is per-
haps the classic example of an emotional sense-processed reaction to 
affective data. But a decision not to respond outwardly at all to an 
affective datum also invokes exercise of emotional sense, as it follows 
the same trajectory of reflective evaluation. By contrast, if the per-
ceiver did not respond outwardly because she did not perceive emo-
tional content in the quiver, that would not represent an invocation of 
the emotionally mediated decisionmaking process (though it might 
represent a failure of emotional sensitivity). 
This is the process through which individual deliberation is in-
formed by emotionally-derived wisdom, the analytically-refined prod-
uct of emotional sense. Thus understood, emotional sense fuels a pre-
linguistic, quasi-inductive reasoning process that reaches deeply into 
cognition.42 It enables us to draw on past experiences of emotional 
states and learned emotional inferences to hypothesize about present 
motives and future behavior in ourselves and by others who may not 
otherwise offer the information. It is through these specialized emo-
tional inferences that we are able to bridge gaps between what we 
can know through more direct means and what we must choose to 
believe (even as a matter of probability) in order to make effective 
decisions.43 Forming a body of emotional wisdom, these beliefs func-
41. This conception of how emotionality is enmeshed in cognition reflects the 
"evaluative" understanding of emotional operation, which follows from the Aristote-
lian critique of the Platonic view. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 22, at 285-93 
(discussing the "evaluative" conception of emotion and reasoning); see also infra Part 
III. 
42. For a more thorough discussion of a similar view of emotionality in cognition, 
see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 22, at 275-79. Kahan and Nussbaum there con-
trast the "mechanistic" view of emotion, in which emotions are considered forces more 
or less devoid of thought or perception, with their preferred "evaluative" conception, 
which holds that emotions "embody beliefs and ways of seeing, which include apprais-
als or evaluations of the importance or significance of objects and events." !d. at 278. 
They further contend that the evaluative view ''has enjoyed widespread acceptance 
and has proven the dominant influence in the development oflaw, if not in legal schol-
arship." Id. 
43. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 28, at 4 (identifying emotions with the process 
by which a person forms the intention to depart from a state of rest). 
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tion as emotionally-derived knowledge.44 Emotional sense, emotion-
ally-derived knowledge, and the emotionally-informed decisionmak-
ing that follows is what ultimately enables us to navigate our 
uncertain world. 
The deliberative use of emotional sense, though largely enabled 
by emotional experience, is more nuanced than the comparatively 
simple, direct experience of particular emotional states. Rather, it 
represents the epistemological process by which emotional knowledge 
is drawn upon to organize input into a state of understanding that 
can then be operated on by more formal inductive reasoning. The in-
sight a person gains into external and/or internal phenomena by test-
ing and evaluating affective data this way yields tremendous 
resources for understanding a situation and making choices about 
what to do next. Making those choices may involve a more purely 
analytic process of reasoning, but the reasoning will be between alter-
natives that have already been appraised by the emotional epistemo-
logical process. It is in this respect that emotional sense is a 
component -an analytically-prior component -of analytic reasoning, 
at least in consideration of matters implicating human affairs.45 It 
helps us to understand experiences that we have not shared, and 
know things we could not otherwise know, constituting an exception-
ally powerful epistemological tool.46 
44. One might argue that what I am calling emotionally-derived knowledge can- · 
not really be regarded like other knowledge, because it is so inherently subjective. It 
is certainly true that emotional knowledge is inherently subjective, but that does not 
mean that it is not like other kinds of knowledge. Essentially, all mentally-held 
knowledge is a collection of beliefs about the world. Like most other forms of knowl-
edge, emotionally-derived knowledge may vary in accuracy. See infra Part III (dis-
cussing emotional error). Similarly, various historic beliefs about the shape of the 
world (considered ''knowledge" in their times) have varied in accuracy, as have count-
less witnesses' convictions (about what the defendant was wearing at the time, etc.). 
But we move through the world relying on the knowledge we carry with us, for better 
or ill, and emotional knowledge, though it may serve us differently than other forms 
of knowledge, should not on this ground be considered of lesser integrity. 
45. That is to say, emotional sense is most epistemologically valuable in inter-
preting matters involving human behavior, like government, and least valuable in 
consideration of abstract sciences that lack an anthropocentrically causal component, 
like physics. 
46. See Pillsbury, supra note 7, at 676-77 ("Emotions are fundamentally a way of 
making sense of the world. We use emotion to synthesize chaotic reality and give it 
personal meaning. Emotion provides the basic means for relating the inner subjective 
self to the outer objective world."). 
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B. Emotionally-Informed Decisionmaking 
This far-reaching view of emotional sense is appropriate to the 
vast influence of emotional sense in our lives.47 Daniel Shapiro at-
tempts to characterize the pervasive presence and influence of emo-
tionally charged experience in setting forth his "Law of Perpetual 
Emotion" as a guide for negotiating lawyers: 
Emotions are a constant stream within us, just as rivers and 
streams flow with an endless deliverance of water. We con-
stantly respond emotionally to the environment surrounding us 
and to our own thoughts, feelings and behaviors. We react emo-
tionally when other negotiators arrive late, smirk at our idea, 
raise their voices, appreciate our ideas or listen closely. We also 
react emotionally when we question the truth of the other's 
statement, worry about how we are going to close the meeting in 
time to pick up the kids at school, and so on.48 
Such environmental emotionality is salient for all people, but it takes 
on special importance for professionals committed to understanding 
the particulars of another's experience enough to help improve it, as 
do lawyers, negotiators, and policymakers.49 Accordingly, some legal 
scholars have called attention to the importance of emotionality as a 
legitimate tool of deliberative epistemology. 5° For example, Professor 
Don Welch explains that emotions 
can enlarge and deepen our perception and understanding of the 
way things are. Not only do certain emotional responses moti-
vate us to learn more about various features of the world, but 
they can foster an appreciation of those realities that goes be-
yond the understanding yielded by a narrower view. Through 
such emotions as sympathy, admiration and fear, for example, 
we identifY with the plight of others, expanding our sense of 
human needs and interest. An affective involvement with the 
47. See, e.g., Justin D'Arms, Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry, 74 Cm.-KENT L. 
REv. 1467, 1468 (2000) ("[E]valuative judgments in particular seem to be so inti-
mately connected to our emotional reactions to the world that it is far from obvious 
how these forms of judgment could proceed without emotional influence."). 
48. Daniel L. Shapiro, A Negotiator's Guide to Emotion: Four 'Laws' to Effective 
Practice, 7 No. 2 DrsP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 4 (2001). 
49. Again, the preceding analysis is not particular to legal deliberation, but re-
flects the way that human beings deliberate about any subject that implicates human 
experience. The special interest that this piece takes in legal deliberation is reflective 
of the heightened societal importance that attaches to deliberation undertaken by 
lawyers, and the fact that lawyers have been historically discouraged from becoming 
more sophisticated about epistemological emotionality. 
50. See, e.g., D'Arms, supra note 47, at 1469 (investigating "empathy's role as a 
means of acquiring knowledge or justified beliefs"). 
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lives of others - such as those for whom public policies are cre-
ated - can contribute to our achievement of clear perception, 
depth of understanding, and keen judgment."51 
247 
Welch thus argues that the emotionality which already plays an un-
deniable role in the discourse of public policy should be at least ac-
knowledged, and preferably welcomed. The argument is not that 
people should make policy decisions only on the basis of direct emo-
tional responses, but that they should use emotional knowledge as 
one tool in the set and consider critically the impacts of emotional 
inputs.52 
To this end, Justice William Brennan warned legal decision-
makers that ignoring emotional input threatens to alienate them 
"from the wellspring from which concepts such as dignity, decency, 
and fairness flow."53 Indeed, the Aristotelian understanding of emo-
tion and cognition has long posited that "emotions are or include 
forms of cognition, and through their education they become the me-
dia of sound evaluative judgment [and] are therefore, in the person of 
practical wisdom, sites of the synthesis of intellect and character that 
define his or her special excellence."54 
As influential as the Aristotelian view of emotion as cognition 
has proved among modern philosophers, it failed over most of the 
course of Western history to displace the prevailing view of his 
teacher, Plato, that emotions are antithetical to reason, morality, and 
51. D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL. 
lNTERDis. L.J. 55, 72 (1997). Professor Welch further argues that "Emotions expand 
our epistemological horizons and broaden our decision making capacities because 
they embody ways of thinking that have traditionally been considered inferior by 
dominant groups. The traditional criticisms of emotional decision making parallel 
and reflect the denigration of women and those traits considered 'feminine.'" I d. at 
73. 
52. Welch argues that emotionality plays a valuable role in the analysis, evalua-
tion, and advocacy of public policy on at least three levels: "first, they motivate indi-
viduals to act in ways that we consider to be moral; second, they enhance our 
understanding and improve our perspective; and third, they serve as warning signals 
that certain judgments or decisions need to be scrutinized carefully .... [l]n at least 
these ways emotional considerations make positive contributions to the development 
of public policy that should be valued rather than scorned." ld. at 67-68. 
53. William J. Brennan, 42nd Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture to Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York (Sept. 14, 1987), reprinted in William J. Bren-
nan, Reason, Passion and "The Progress of the Law", 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 3, 22 (1988). 
54. John Deigh, Nussbaum's Defense of the Stoic Theory of Emotions, 19 QVIN-
NIPIAC L. REv. 293, 295 (2000) (explaining Aristotle's views on the relationship be-
tween emotion and cognition). See also Part III, infra (same). 
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justice.55 It is this philosophical legacy that saturates the legal cul-
ture, and that encourages lawyers to disavow consideration of emo-
tional inputs even as they surreptitiously rely upon them, 
continuously if unconsciously, in the work of deliberation and negoti-
ation.56 Even as the emotion-cognition dichotomy loses traction in 
modem philosophy, it clings tightly in legal arenas, curtailing the 
ability of lawyers, judges, and lawmakers to marshal fully the re-
sources available to them in pursuit of their deliberative ends. 
III. EMOTION & REASON IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A CuLTURAL 
LEGACY OF DuALISTIC OPPOSITION 
It is one of the marks of a civilized culture that it has devised 
legal procedures that minimize the impact of emotional reactions 
and strive for calm and rational disposition. 
-Henry Weihofen57 
Epistemological appeal to emotional sense is universal, but law 
relegates it to a suspect category of cognition. Why? 
A. Hegemonic Rationality and the Law 
In reviewing the general suppression of emotionality in legal are-
nas, Professor Samuel Pillsbury invites us to consider the paradig-
matic images that Americans hold of ''justice" and "injustice." 
Justice, he reminds us, takes place "in a somber courtroom where a 
robed judge, sworn jurors, and informed counsel calmly and delibera-
tively apply their highest powers of reason to reach a legal deci-
sion."58 By contrast, "[i]njustice is a blood-thirsty mob bearing lit 
torches, pounding on the doors of the jail, desperate to wreak bodily 
revenge upon the suspected wrongdoer held within."59 To him, these 
images reflect the general juridical disposition toward reason and 
emotion, namely that "Emotion is unalterably opposed to Reason and 
thus to Justice itself."60 
Certainly, the accomplishment of a legal system that protects de-
fendants from the tyranny of the angry lynch mob should be consid-
ered among our proudest cultural accomplishments. And indeed, 
55. See infra Part Ill. 
56. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Legal Emotion: The Women's Story in Totem and Ta-
boo, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1139 (1995) (observing the unconsciousness of this process). 
57. HENRY WEIHOFEN, THE URGE To PuNisH 131 (1959). 
58. Pillsbury, supra note 7, at 655. 
59. Id. 
60. !d. 
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decision-makers may be unduly swayed by inadequately considered 
emotional responses as often as their decisions may fail to take 
proper account of emotionally-informed wisdom. But fear of the for-
mer has driven the work of all emotionality underground in legal are-
nas, where it continues to influence deliberation beyond recognition 
or redress.61 As Professor Eric Posner has noted, legal theory's neg-
lect of emotions "should be puzzling, because emotions play an impor-
tant role in many areas of the law."62 Various legal rules explicitly 
contemplate emotion, including criminal law doctrines contrasting 
crimes of premeditation and passion, and most rules of evidence have 
been designed to prevent the prejudicial inflammation of jurors' sen-
timents.63 Emotional bases have sufficed for recovery in tort64 and to 
justify various health and environmental risk regulations.65 
But consideration of emotional sense reveals that the implicit 
role of emotionality in legal discourse goes much deeper. The reflec-
tive processing of affective data goes to how lawyers evaluate the con-
tent of a client's story, a legal argument, or a litigation proceeding, 
and how they formulate appropriate responses. As Daniel Shapiro 
warns lawyers wary of acknowledging the role of emotionality in 
their practice, "[j]ust because we exclude something does not mean 
that it no longer affects us."66 And as marketing professionals well 
know, human judgment is especially vulnerable to distortion by the 
persuasive influence of inputs we do not consciously heed (hence, the 
pervasiveness of thinly-veiled sexual innuendo in marketing cam-
paigns, and the increasing saturation of all commercial venues by 
inconspicuous advertising67 ). By excluding consideration of epis-
temological emotionality, we remain subject to its influence but pow-
erless to refine or even resist its contribution. 
61. See id. at 684. 
62. Posner, supra note 22, at 1977. 
63. See id. 
64. For example, the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of 
consortium, etc. 
65. See Posner, supra note 22, at 1977. 
66. Shapiro, supra note 48, at 3. 
67. For example, advertising now appears on the floors of supermarkets, in the 
corners of television screens during feature programs, and on the sides of fast-food 
containers. The now forbidden (but exceptionally effective) practice by which movie 
theaters once spliced individual frames showing food items into feature films to en-
courage concession sales also speaks to the vulnerability of the human mind to sub-
conscious persuasion. See VANcE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS: WHAT MAKEs 
Us BuY, BELIEVE, AND EVEN VOTE THE WAY WE Do (1957) (discussing the use of sub-
liminal advertising in film); WILSON BRIAN KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION (1974) (dis-
cussing subliminal advertising in general). Outcry following publication of these 
books led to the Federal Communications Commission's declaration that "the use of 
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Nevertheless, lawyers are understandably reluctant to acknowl-
edge such unpalatably "soft" deliberative inputs given the predomi-
nant culture of the law, which follows the tradition established by 
millennia of Western thinkers exalting analytical thinking as the 
very vehicle of justice and denigrating emotionality as a mentally 
passive, unruly characteristic that "undermines rationality and im-
pinges upon moral responsibility."68 The legal culture's reluctance to 
acknowledge the pivotal function of emotionality in deliberation is a 
vestige of the dichotomy that Western philosophy historically im-
posed on cognition and emotion as competing elements in the mental 
landscape. As Pillsbury describes, 
[t]he predominant culture of the law promotes formal, delibera-
tive, and dispassionate decisionmaking. Its modern ideal is a 
complete rationalistic rule structure which determines results 
in an objective, i.e., impersonal, fashion. Legal adjudication 
centers around proceedings of religious solemnity according to 
principles of scriptural authority. The culture of modern law 
discourages informal, intuitive, personal, or passionate 
decisionmaking. 69 
Even lawyers who practice in such "soft" legal areas such as media-
tion are hindered by the legal culture's disdain for acknowledging the 
role of deliberative emotionality. Professor Dwight Golann, apractic-
ing mediator, confesses the paradigmatic concern of lawyers con-
fronting emotionality in his admission that "[t]he fact is, I sometimes 
don't feel that I'm being professional when I work with emotions. It's 
not what lawyers do."70 When prompted to describe what does "feel 
professional," Golann cited "dealing with facts and arguments, ana-
lyzing issues, generating strategies and, most important, solving 
problems."71 Despite the fact that even Golann's evaluation of pro-
fessional norms explicitly draws on emotional input, his legal train-
ing has created cognitive dissonance for him about the role of 
emotional inputs in what is perhaps the most overtly emotional area 
of law.72 
subliminal perception is inconsistent with the obligations of a licensee and contrary to 
the public interest because, whether effective or not, such broadcasts are intended to 
be deceptive." 39 Fed. Reg. 3714 (Jan. 29, 1974). 
68. Pillsbury, supra note 7, at 674. 
69. Id. at 665. 
70. Golann & Golann, supra note 23, at 26. 
71. Id. 
72. Unlike litigation, mediation often expressly encourages participants to con-
sult and express emotional bases for their positions in the mediated dispute. See, e.g., 
Mary Elizabeth Lund, A Focus on Emotion In Mediation Training, 38 Fam. & Concili-
ation Courts Rev. 62, 62 (2000) ("[M]ediators must learn to understand their own 
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It serves neither the clients nor the process when lawyers are 
preoccupied with their professional identities while trying to manage 
the overt emotionality that arises in negotiated dispute resolution en-
vironments.73 Clients who feel that their attorney is missing or ig-
noring the emotional impact of their dilemma may become dispirited, 
and those who perceive their attorney's distaste for dealing with the 
significant emotional content of their case may become angry. But as 
Golann's example demonstrates, lawyers who learn to subjugate 
emotional sense to suit the decorum of the profession - beginning 
early on in law schooF4 - face great difficulty resurrecting it for the 
more facile manipulation required in the various settings of legal ne-
gotiation with clients, adversaries, and colleagues. Legal education 
is beginning to address the problem, 75 but for most, the maxim re-
mains that "the law is reason, free from passion."76 
B. Law and Philosophy on Emotional Knowledge 
The traditional Western hostility toward emotionality in rea-
soned discourse dates back at least to Plato's metaphysics, as devel-
oped in THE REPUBLIC. There Plato expounded his understanding of 
the tripartite human soul, which he saw as constituted by motivation 
(impulses and appetites), cognition (rational thought and will), and 
passion (literally "thumos," translated as the higher emotions77), the 
emotions and the emotional reactions of mediation participants to intervene effec-
tively in conflict."). 
73. One mediator observes that "given their left-hemisphere mindset, attorneys 
sometimes have great difficulty dealing with the emotions of their clients. Having 
been trained in the logic-driven rigors of fact-finding, analysis, and debate, it can be-
come impossible to properly address highly charged matters of the heart and spirit. 
For that matter, attorneys often unwittingly feed the emotional fires of their clients." 
L. Therese White & Bill White, Managing Client Emotions, 56 DisP. RESOL. J. 15, 16 
(2002). 
74. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Lawyering at the Margins: On Reason and Emotion, 11 
AM. U. J. GENDER, Soc. PoL'Y & L. 129, 130 (2002) ("When I was a student in law 
school, we were told that we had to completely separate any emotion we might feel 
from the principles for which we were reading cases, that to succeed in law school and 
to be successful lawyers, we had to learn to bifurcate our reasoning from our 
emotions."). 
75. See generally Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 
5 PsYCHOL., PuB. PoL'Y, & L. 1173 (1999) (observing that the traditional black-letter 
law school curriculum is giving way to one that also teaches interpersonal lawyering 
skills, and arguing that more such change is needed). 
76. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 146 (Ernest Baker trans., 1946). 
77. Klaus R. Scherer, Plato's Legacy: Relationships Between Cognition, Emotion, 
and Motivation 2 (1995) (unpublished manuscript) at http://www.unige.ch/fapse/emo-
tionlpublications/pdf/plato.pdf) (last visited Jan. 2, 2005) (summarizing keynote ad-
dresses at meetings of the Societe Pschologique de Quebec, Quebec 1993, and the 
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latter of which acted to curb motivation in the service of cognition. 
Reflecting his analogous theory of relations between social classes, 
Plato assumed a strict separation and innate antagonism between 
the three, and posited the ethical supremacy of cognition over emo-
tion and appetite. 78 
Plato's views have suffered periodic criticism over time, perhaps 
most importantly from his own student, Aristotle, who rejected 
Plato's separatist account in favor of his own belief that emotional 
experiences incorporate rational beliefs and judgments such that 
emotion and cognition are inextricably entangled.79 Nevertheless, 
Plato's morally-charged segregation of emotion and cognition per-
sisted over the centuries in influencing philosophical efforts to parse 
mental phenomena.80 His philosophical legacy remained vital during 
the Middle Ages in the writings of St. Augustine,81 during the Ren-
aissance Period in Descartes' mind-body dualism,82 and into the Age 
of Enlightenment in the work of Immanuel Kant and Moses 
Mendelsohn. 83 
Even as modern and postmodern philosophers eventually moved 
on from Plato's dichotomy, it remains alive and well in legal dis-
course. For example, in "Sentimental Journey," an article written on 
the occasion of Justice Harry Blackmun's retirement from the Su-
preme Court, Professor Jeffrey Rosen voices the paradigmatic hostil-
ity to emotionality in legal analysis in his critique of Justice 
Blackmun's jurisprudence, which he considers overly emotional: 
[F]eeling deeply is no substitute for arguing rigorously; and the 
qualities that made Blackman an admirable man ultimately 
condemned him to be an ineffective Justice. By reducing so 
many cases to their human dimensions and refusing to justify 
his impulses with principled legal arguments, Blackmun 
showed the dangers of the jurisprudence of sentiment.84 
Assoziatione Italiana de la Psicologia delle Emozioni, Milano 1994) (citing the trans-
lation of "thumos" from the Encyclopedia Britannica). 
78. This ethical model supported Plato's idealized class of the philosopher/king. 
Id at 2. For a deeper discussion of the impact of Platonic metaphysics on Western 
conceptions of emotion and cognition, see id. at 1-7. 
79. See .ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 87-105 (Book II, Parts v-vii) (H. 
Rackham, trans., William Heinemann ed., 2d ed. 1934). Aristotle is also famous, how-
ever, for the maxim that "the law is reason, free of passion." ARISTOTLE, THE PoLITICS 
OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 76. . 
80. See Freeman, supra note 28, at 1-2. 
81. See id. at 1. 
82. See id. at 2. 
83. See Scherer, supra note 77, at 3. 
84. Rosen, supra note 7, at 13. 
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Rosen's argument resounds Platonic, but the debate was subse-
quently joined by Professor Martha Nussbaum, who turned to Aris-
totle for support in refuting the categorical rejection of reasoned 
emotionality that Rosen's view represents: 
Rosen appears to believe, as I think quite a lot of people do 
before they start thinking much about the structure of emotions, 
that emotions are something quite unthinking, opposed to rea-
soning in some very strong and primitive way, and that they are 
mindless surges of affect. Simply stated, they believe that 
emotions do not contain or rest upon any kind of thought. [But 
emotions] are really not at all like gusts of wind or surges of the 
blood ... 85 
Nussbaum argues that Artistotle's position in THE RHETORIC better 
accounts for the sophisticated relationship between emotion and 
cognition: 
[Aristotle] argued that to have anger, you have to have certain 
beliefs about what has happened, about the seriousness of what 
has happened, about the deliberateness with which that dam-
age was inflicted, and a host of other beliefs .... So, emotions 
are not just mindless; they embody thoughts. Therefore, we 
cannot dismiss them from judicial reasoning and writing just by 
opposing them in an unreflective way to reasoning and 
thought.86 
Despite increasing support among legal academics for the Aristote-
lian view that emotion is inextricable from cognition, many practicing 
lawyers still habitually side with Plato about the appropriate role of 
emotionality in "reasoned" discourse. For example, negotiation coach 
Jim Camp asks the question "Can Women Be Great Negotiators?" 
and answers with the resounding "As Long As They Keep Their Emo-
tions Under Control."S7 
Accordingly, we tend to downplay the importance of the role of 
emotionality in deliberation, or at best to characterize it in de-emo-
tionalized terms (for example, "intuition" or "experience"), and we are 
made uncomfortable when the constant pulse of emotional undercur-
rent breaches the surface. Not coincidentally, the stigma attached to 
overt expressions of emotionality in realms of "reason" marginalizes 
from public discourse people whose emotionality runs close to the 
85. Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JoHN's L. 
REV. 23, 24-5 (1996). 
86. Id. 
87. See, e.g., Camp, supra note 6. 
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surface of expression - for example, many women, 88 as well as other 
members of historically subordinated groups. 89 Emotional men are 
twice damned, betraying dominant cultural norms and the acceptable 
norms for their gender. 
Still, prominent voices from the law have occasionally taken posi-
tions more supportive of a unified view of emotion and cognition. In 
THE ART OF THE ADvocATE, English barrister Richard Du Cann fa-
mously argued that "most human action is prompted by feeling,"90 
and that it would distort reality to suggest that "emotion is an unreli-
able guide to a true decision on fact, and that there is therefore some-
thing suspect in evoking or displaying emotion."91 Even Oliver 
Wendell Holmes suggests the primacy of inductive reasoning over de-
ductive logic in his observation that "the life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience."92 Implicit in his statement is the no-
tion that experience entails something more than just analytical pro-
cess; it recognizes important patterns, understands why they are 
important, and suggests epistemological empathy. 
More recently, Justice Stephen Breyer invoked the important 
role that emotional data plays in his jurisprudence during his confir-
mation hearings. Praising the emotional content in the work of one 
of the Bronte sisters, Breyer described how literature helps him en-
gage his emotional sense in the face of academic antagonism toward 
emotionality. The story Justice Breyer turned to is one about endless 
row-houses, and as he explained, 
what Bronte tells you is they are not the same. Each one of 
those persons and each one of those houses and each one of 
those families is different, and they each have a story to tell. 
Each of those stories involves something about human passion. 
88. See Welch, supra note 51, at 73 ("The traditional criticisms of emotional deci-
sionmaking parallel and reflect the denigration of women and those traits considered 
'feminine.'"); Deborah M. Kolb, Her Place at the Table: Gender and Negotiation, in 
NEGOTIATION 141 (Lavinia Hall ed., 1993) (arguing that "women's voices are often 
hushed in formal negotiation" because, inter alia, "[w]hat women expect from interac-
tions is a grounding for emotional connection, empathy, shared experiences and mu-
tual sensitivity, and responsibility. In this two-way interactional model, to 
understand is as important as being understood and empowerment is as important as 
being empowered."). 
89. See Welch, supra note 51, at 73 ("Emotions expand our epistemological hori-
zons and broaden our decisionmaking capacities because they embody ways of think-
ing that have traditionally been considered inferior by dominant groups."). 
90. RICHARD nu CANN, THE ART OF THE ADvocATE (Penguin Books 1964), cited in 
John C. Shepherd & Jordan B. Cherrick, Advocacy and Emotion, 138 F.R.D. 619, 620 
(1991). 
91. Id. 
92. HoLMES, THE CoMMON LAw 1 (University Press: John Wilson & Sons 1881). 
Spring 2005] The Discourse Beneath 
Each of those stories involves a man, a woman, children, fami-
lies, work, lives. And you get that sense out of the book. So 
sometimes, I have found literature very helpful as a way out of 
the tower.93 
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The "tower" Justice Breyer speaks of is of the ivory persuasion, repre-
senting the Western intellectual tradition of celebrating analysis 
quarantined from emotionality. 
Modern philosophers have also made intellectual room for emo-
tionality as a legitimate, and even valuable, tool of epistemology. For 
example, Professor Robert Nozick has postulated that emotions cap-
ture experience in a different, more representational manner than 
language-based memories can - an analog recording to language's 
digital version of events.94 He argues that emotion is a valuable way 
of knowing things because the experience of a "fitting'' emotion (one 
that is reasonably proportionate to the triggering affective data) con-
veys a special quality of information about value: 
Emotions provide a kind of picture of value, I think. They are 
our internal psychophysiological response to the external value, 
a response that is specially close by being not only due to that 
value but an analog representation of it. [95] •.• Emotion pro-
vides a psychophysical replica of value, perhaps by exhibiting a 
parallel mode of organization, perhaps also by itself possessing 
some of the characteristics (such as intensity and depth) in-
volved in value .... A mere evaluation, unaccompanied by feel-
ing, can state that it is valuable and even track when it is 
valuable, but it cannot give us a representation or model of the 
value or of the situation of that thing's being valuable, The pecu-
liarly intimate connection of emotion to value resides in the way 
emotion can provide an analog model of value and of its more 
inclusive salient category.9 6 
Nozick's insight is that emotional knowledge represents a true differ-
ence in kind from language-based knowledge, due to the unique qual-
ity of representation that inheres in affect. He suggests metaphors of 
the visual image versus the textual description, or the analog repre-
sentation versus digital representation, to convey the way in which 
93. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 
2d Sess. 232-33 (1994) (statement of Stephen G. Breyer), cited in Nussbaum, supra 
note 85, at 23. 
94. See Nozick, supra note 1, at 96-7. 
95. "Roughly put," Nozick explains in a footnote, "an analog model or representa-
tion of a process somehow replicates that process rather than merely describing it." 
Id. at 93 n."*". 
96. Id. at 93, 98. 
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emotional thoughts track their sources of inspiration by intensity or 
by that ineffable quality of value (the goodness or badness of the 
thing or situation that stimulates an affective response) that lan-
guage can only describe but not contain. In acknowledging emotional 
insight as a category of cognition, Nozick departs substantially from 
the traditional view. 
Professor Justin D'Arms refutes the Platonic separation between 
reason and emotion more directly in asserting the epistemological 
value of empathy. 97 He acknowledges that emotions can occasionally 
distort good judgment (what Nozick might call an "unfitting" emo-
tion), and credits to that intuition the historical disjunction between 
reason and emotion which has given rise to the notion "that the con-
ditions for good legal and ethical judgment are cool and dispassion-
ate."98 As he explains;"[s]ometimes things are not as they seem to us 
when we are in the grip of an emotional reaction. Not everything we 
are ashamed of is really shameful, not everything that angers us is 
really objectionable."99 However, he argues that instances in which 
an emotion distorts good judgment should be regarded as special 
cases of "emotional error," which should no more displace the role of 
emotionality in good judgment than should the fact that our eyes and 
ears occasionally play tricks on us displace our trust in vision and 
hearing as aids to good judgment: 
The possibility of emotional error shows that it would be a mis-
take to trust one's emotional reactions in every case. But it is 
important to recognize that the mere possibility of emotional er-
ror is an insufficient basis for returning to an older conception of 
judgment and evaluation that aspires to immunize these 
processes from emotional influence. Mter all, sensory error is 
possible as well. But to grant that vision and hearing can pro-
duce illusions and mistaken beliefs is not to grant that these 
sensory modalities have no role to play in rational judgment .... 
The possibility of emotional error should be treated as a reason 
for caution and fallibalism about our emotional reactions, rather 
than as a reason to attempt to purge them completely.100 
D'Arms further emphasizes that "evaluative judgments in particular 
seem to be so intimately connected to our emotional reactions to the 
world that it is far from obvious how these forms of judgment could 
97. D'ARMs, supra note 47, at 1469. 
98. Id. at 1468. 
99. ld. 
100. Id. 
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proceed without emotional influence,"101 reflecting an understanding 
of cognition that closely mirrors the concept of emotional sense. 
The concept of emotional error provides an important vehicle for 
distinguishing between the strengths and weaknesses of emotionally-
derived beliefs about the world. Returning to Professor Pillsbury's 
lynch mob, or even reflecting on the first blush of romance, we might 
easily extrapolate that emotionally-informed understanding formu-
lated during a heightened emotional state is especially prone to error, 
and particularly likely to foster distorted judgment.102 That is why 
we don't entrust sentencing decisions to lynch mobs (and perhaps 
why parental consent is required for marriages between seventeen-
year-aids). 
At the same time, the heightened emotional state conveys valua-
ble information about the root cause. Outrage over a crime speaks to 
the heinous nature of the wrong, even if it can't ensure due process 
for the alleged perpetrator. Giddiness in the new romantic speaks 
powerfully to motivation, even if it can't necessarily be relied upon as 
a long-term indicator. In addition, though judgments made during a 
state of heightened emotion may warrant critical scrutiny, the emo-
tional knowledge of rage and elation that follows from the experience 
may serve to enhance later deliberation, when the stored information 
about rage or elation may be cross-referenced against incoming affec-
tive data, allowing the deliberation to be informed by an understand-
ing of the nature and consequences of passion in a comparatively 
dispassionate way. 
Critical evaluation of emotional epistemology is thus necessary 
to help deliberators learn to distinguish between circumstances in 
which emotionally-informed judgment deserves scrutiny, and circum-
stances in which it can provide important insight. Moreover, such 
critical evaluation could inform efforts to improve important avenues 
of legal decisionmaking. Our legal institutions already take account 
of emotional epistemology in structuring jury decisionmaking so as to 
avoid some of the ways in which emotion can contribute to bad judg-
ment. For example, rules of evidence that exclude "prejudicial" 
materials from the consideration of jurors follow from the common-
sense understanding that, as discussed above, judgments made dur-
ing a heightened state of emotion (e.g., disgust or outrage) are espe-
cially prone to emotional error. But are there ways in which legal 
101. D'ARMs, supra note 47, at 1468. 
102. It warrants noting that the concept of "emotional error" serves an epistemo-
logical function only; a judgment-obscuring emotion like embarrassment or jealousy is 
not necessarily "erroneous" in other respects. 
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institutions could foster more positive contributions by emotional in-
sight to decisionmaking? 
At least one legal academic has suggested that they can, and 
should. Indeed, Professor Pillsbury maintains that the criminal jus-
tice system is already so hopelessly driven by emotionally-informed 
decisionmaking that justice requires legal reform to assist jurors and 
judges in more effectively managing the contributions of their emo-
tional insights. He recommends that jury instructions should be 
given with explicit directions to aid jurors in appropriately channel-
ing their various emotional responses while they evaluate evidence 
and consider sentencing recommendations. His suggestion is not 
that raw emotion dictate the result, nor that emotional input entirely 
be purged (though he argues that the current, emotionally "neutral" 
instructions do both, the former ironically resulting from the latter). 
Rather, he urges that legal institutions should help jurors consciously 
synthesize the emotional and analytical insights they have accumu-
lated in reviewing the evidence into a coherent, fully deliberated legal 
judgment.103 For example, Pillsbury proposes that courts could in-
struct capital juries on moral outrage and empathy in death-sentenc-
ing decisions as follows: 
The sentencing decision which lies before you is one of the most 
important you will ever make. Although you should approach 
the decision rationally, your emotions- your feelings- will nec-
essarily be involved as well. You should not let your emotions 
decide the case but rather should use your emotions to help you 
decide. 
The crime of which [name of the defendant] stands convicted is 
one of great evil, and to the extent you feel anger at the wrongs 
to others for which the defendant is legally responsible, there is 
nothing wrong with feeling such anger. But anger can over-
whelm proper judgment. To ensure that it does not, I suggest 
you try to care for the good in [defendant]. 
As a human being [defendant] is a person who has done some 
good as well as bad and is capable of good as well as bad. Set 
aside your feelings about the crime for a moment and consider 
the defendant as you might a neighbor, a colleague at work, or a 
social acquaintance, someone that you know and care about. 
Consider the extent to which [defendant] has done and is capa-
ble of doing good. Then reconsider what [defendant] did in this 
case. 
103. See Pillsbury, supra note 7, at 703-04. 
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If, while keeping in mind all that is positive about [defendant] 
you determine that [he or she] deserves the maximum penalty, 
then, and only then, should you vote to impose it.104 
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Pillsbury's work highlights that under-appreciation of unconscious 
emotional input to decisionmaking represents the chief weakness of 
emotionally-informed understanding. Acknowledging the value of in-
sights informed by both outrage and empathy, Pillsbury's proposal 
would help jurors consider and evaluate the sources from which their 
judgments arise to reach a wise conclusion in an environment of inde-
terminate inputs. His work recognizes the potential for judgment en-
hancement by emotional insight but also for judgment distortion by 
emotional inputs that are not subject to healthy deliberative scrutiny 
(reflecting the marketers' grasp of our vulnerability to subconscious 
persuasion105). But Pillsbury warns that healthy scrutiny is compro-
mised by a legal culture that refuses to more openly consider the cog-
nitive function of emotional inputs. 
Contemporary scholars in science and humanities disciplines 
have also posited that cognition and emotion are not mutually exclu-
sive functions of the mind, often characterizing the relationship as 
one of symbiosis.1°6 Professor Stephen Fineman argues that, con-
trary to the rational conception of organizational behavior, emotion is 
the unifying principle around which modern organizations func-
tion.107 Professor Arthur Jacobson has explored the relationships be-
tween emotionality and legal institutions themselves, introducing his 
project by explaining the driving but under-recognized force of emo-
tional response in legal decisionmaking: 
My aim is to uncover the unconscious emotions characteristi-
cally associated with some basic legal institutions. These emo-
tions are ones we invariably have when we follow or enforce 
rules, fulfill duties, and claim or exercise rights. We know the 
conscious emotions that we experience - the cruelty of rules and 
our fear of them, the hopes in rights, security of duties, and so 
forth. Yet not all the emotions that we encounter in basic legal 
institutions are conscious. We experience unconscious emotions 
as well.108 
104. ld. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
106. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 28, at 6; see also Part VI, infra. 
107. FINEMAN, supra note 18 (arguing that rational and cognitive elements are 
"subordinate to and encompassed by" the emotional in organizational behavior). 
108. Jacobson, supra note 56. 
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Such research increasingly recognizes the foundational role that emo-
tional experience plays in all human constructs, legal institutions 
included. 
C. Emotionality and Leadership 
When the presence of emotion no longer indicates the absence of 
rationality, then perhaps lawyers who emerge as political leaders will 
be permitted to manifest greater emotional sensitivity in public life. 
Certainly, that day had not yet arrived in 1972, when Ed Muskie's 
quest for the democratic presidential nomination was ended by tears 
he shed while refuting personal criticism of his wife, 109 nor in 1988, 
when the tears Patricia Schroeder shed on withdrawing from her own 
presidential campaign. became more memorable than any of her ac-
complishments as an undefeated twelve-term member of Con-
gress.110 
However, in 2003, tears shed by presidential candidate John 
Kerry made news for - not really making news. Mter Kerry welled 
up while listening to an unemployed woman's determination to send 
her children to college, American Politics specialist Jeffrey Berry told 
a reporter, "America has changed and matured, and we no longer 
equate masculinity with John Wayne on a horse. So politicians are 
allowed a ... broader palette of emotions."111 That so many political 
leaders are also lawyers ensures that many of the professional norms 
of lawyering carry over to the political sphere - but most voters are 
not lawyers, and perhap~ this accounts for the growing disjuncture 
between an American public that demands emotional sensitivity from 
political leaders and the iawyer/politicians who perceive emotional 
sensitivity as a sign of weakness. 
Professor Nussbaum argues that emotionality should not only be 
tolerated but is, in fact, a necessary element of public decisionmaking 
in her assessment that "[s]ympathetic emotion that is tethered to the 
evidence and free from [unreasonable bias] is not only acceptable, but 
actually essential to public judgment."112 Indeed, the voting public 
109. See Jill Lawrence, "Woman's Plight Pushes Kerry to Tears," USA ToDAY (on-
line), Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-09-
03-kerry-usat_x.htm ("The incident has been immortalized in campaign lore as the 
reason the Maine senator failed to win the nomination."). 
110. See Gwen Florio, "Another male-dominated campaign raises the question: 
When will we finally have our first Ms. President?" TIMES UNION, Sept. 28, 2003, at 
G1, available at 2003 WL 59897921 (noting that "[A]t least as many people know 
Schroeder for the tears she shed that day as for the fact that she ran for president."). 
111. See Lawrence, supra note 109. 
112. Nussbaum, supra note 85, at 25. 
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appears to be converging on Nussbaum's view, at least as indicated 
by the current conventional wisdom that a political candidate must 
"connect emotionally" with voters to be a serious contender. As Pro-
fessor Don Welch has observed, 
We want public policy made by people who find emotional 
resonance with those for whom public policy is made. While Bill 
Clinton's affirmation, "I feel your pain" has now been widely 
caricatured, that statement initially struck a responsive chord 
with the electorate.113 
Welch maintains that President Clinton's "I-feel-your-pain" refrain 
became the object of ridicule not because Americans decided that it 
was unimportant for a president to empathize with citizens, but be-
cause many observers began to question its sincerity.114 
Presidential politics demonstrate the empirical reality that cul-
tural norms about emotionality are in flux. People experience vastly 
diverging levels of comfort with overt expressions of emotionality, 
and they differ in opinion about the appropriate relationship between 
emotionality and reason. After all, we may want our presidential 
candidates to feel our pain when deliberating public policy choices, 
but many probably still don't want them to cry about it in public. 
So what is the message for lawyers? If anything, the added di-
mension of cultural uncertainty makes it even more important that 
lawyers become more conscientiously fluent in emotional subtext. Al-
though epistemological emotionality in individual deliberation is 
laden with these conflicting cultural mores and the resulting profes-
sional self-doubt among lawyers, the stakes run even higher in set-
tings of collective deliberation. There, success hinges on the ability of 
participants not only to manage emotionally-informed individual de-
liberation, but to establish a learning environment that effectively 
mediates between differing preferences and approaches. 
IV. THE NEGOTIATION BENEATH 
Two excesses: to exclude reason, to admit nothing but reason. 
-Blaise Pascal115 
Intricate as it may be, individual deliberation is merely the prep-
aration for the matrix of interaction that then unfolds between the 
deliberator and others in the cast of characters who will determine 
113. Welch, supra note 51, at 68. 
114. Id. 
115. BLAISE PAScAL, PENSEES 85 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., Penguin Books 1966) 
(1670). 
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how a given matter will actually be resolved. The individual must 
now turn from the deliberation within back to the client, the constitu-
ent, partner, adversary, or judge and engage in an iterated process of 
collective deliberation about the end result - a process generally rec-
ognized as negotiation. 
The importance of skilled negotiation to lawyering can hardly be 
understated, since, as argued below,116 most lawyering activities can 
be understood in the broad terms of negotiation. The importance of 
emotionally-informed deliberation to skilled negotiation is founda-
tional, as currents of emotionality in negotiation run deep. Partici-
pants nimbly interpret emotional cues and adjust responsively, 
setting off wave after wave of new interpretation and response. More 
overtly expressed emotion can lubricate progress or destabilize the 
process, depending on the content of the demonstration and the re-
ceptiveness of the audience. Often, the epistemological emotional ex-
ercise of empathy becomes the necessary ingredient for building 
bridges across gulfs of perspective, cultural differences, and distribu-
tional conflict in the face of scarce or disputed resources. 
This Part explores how negotiators rely on emotional resources 
to help shepherd the negotiating process past pitfalls of misunder-
standing, communication breakdown, damaged trust, and even sub-
stantive impasse. Expanding on the use of emotional sense in 
individual deliberation, negotiators consult a constant stream of emo-
tional data during the negotiation to monitor and respond to signs of 
progress or looming peril. But in addition to monitoring subtle emo-
tional undercurrents, negotiators must establish a carefully cali-
brated forum for direct emotional expression that takes account of 
the cultural and idiosyncratic preferences of individual participants. 
Within this "wise emotional dialogue," negotiators can deploy overtly 
emotional cues for targeted effects and defuse emotional error or ex-
ploitation. Establishing a wise emotional dialogue confronts each ne-
gotiator with the responsibility of balancing the tensions that arise 
between encouraging and defusing, indulging and withstanding, and 
conveying and concealing emotional impulses as required by the 
unique circumstances of each negotiation. All the while, negotiators 
contend with the mystery of intuition and the hurdles of cognitive 
biases, each adaptively informed by emotional sense. 
Ultimately, each task engages negotiators in what becomes an 
epistemological emotionality-loop: an individual must consult her 
own emotional sense to hypothesize about the other parties' projected 
116. See infra Part IV.A. 
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experiences (and respond accordingly), and then consult emotional 
sense to evaluate the success of her projections (and modify as neces-
sary) - all as the other parties concurrently (and interactively) en-
gage in the same looped process. This discursive process of 
evaluating and adjusting to emotive expression and undercurrents, 
which proceeds continuously beneath the substantive exchange on 
which attention is directly focused, constitutes the Negotiation Be-
neath. Facilitating the substantive negotiation above, the Negotia-
tion Beneath generates a constant stream of connective tissue that 
holds the overall enterprise together against the forces of inherent 
interest conflicts that might otherwise tear an emerging resolution 
apart. 
A. Negotiation and Lawyering 
In evaluating the significance of emotional knowledge to negoti-
ated lawyering, it is important to first appreciate the breadth of the 
enterprise. 
The most prevalent kind of negotiation extends far beyond the 
traditional deal-making and dispute resolution that comes to mind 
for many lawyers, though it certainly includes these bargain-based 
practices as well. Professor Roger Fisher, a founder of modern nego-
tiation theory, describes negotiation in this most basic form as a pro-
cess of iterated communication for the purpose of reaching a joint 
decision. 117 "Like it or not," he explains, "you are a negotiator," and 
you do it every day.118 In addition to the settlement conference, ven-
ture planning, or treaty negotiation, you negotiate "with your spouse 
about where to go for dinner and with your child about when the 
lights go out ... [negotiation] is back-and-forth communication de-
signed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some 
interests that are shared and others that are opposed."119 Even 
reaching agreement with another on how to understand a case or 
structure an argument constitutes this most basic form of iterated, 
deliberative exchange. 
Viewed as such, nearly all lawyering activities are negotiation at 
varying levels of interaction and formality. A lawyer engaged in a 
settlement or plea bargaining conference is negotiating in the com-
monly understood way, attempting to get the best deal for her client. 
But the same lawyer engages similar skills of listening, persuasion, 
117. See FISHER, DRY & PA'ITON, supra note 25, at 32. 
118. Id. at xvii. 
119. ld. 
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and brainstorming when meeting with a client to discuss a case, or 
strategizing for litigation with colleagues. In all contexts, she must 
work to understand the other parties' beliefs and concerns and con-
vey her own ideas in a manner that the other parties can understand 
and will find persuasive. She must work to establish a learning envi-
ronment in which the parties can collaborate toward formulating the 
plan of action that most satisfies the various interests at hand. 
Even legal writing draws on certain negotiating skills. Like the 
effective dealmaker, the effective writer must understand his audi-
ence and engage them in a persuasive (if seemingly one-sided) dia-
logue that anticipates their concerns and demonstrates why his 
proposal is the best answer while maintaining sensitivity to the audi-
ence's special needs or sensitivities (e.g., the court's demand for re-
spect, a potential opponent's need not to feel cornered, a decision-
maker's desire not to appear biased, etc). 
Recognizing the pervasive importance of negotiation to lawyer-
ing, many law schools have focused increasing attention on the need 
for better negotiation training in the curriculum. Once a sporadically 
offered or backwater skills course, some schools have now invested in 
the development of sophisticated negotiation teaching and research 
programs, such as the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law 
School, the Stanford Center on Conflict Resolution, and the Univer-
sity of Missouri-Columbia Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. 
A few law schools even require negotiation training for first year stu-
dents, such as Stanford and William & Mary. While more traditional 
negotiation programs focus primarily on bargaining skills, some have 
also introduced the development of interpersonal skills training that 
introduces students to personality profiles, conflict styles, and en-
hanced listening skills, representing a solid model upon which to base 
training of emotional sense and the related skills discussed here. 120 
Better training in those areas would serve lawyers well in the 
complicated negotiating circumstances they often encounter. As in 
individual deliberation, negotiating lawyers must recognize and re-
spond to a variety of affective data. But in a culture as ambivalent 
about the role of emotionality as it is immersed in it, managing the 
exercise of emotional sensibility in professional contexts proves a bal-
ancing act fraught with its own special tensions. Compassion, excite-
ment, and hope are all building blocks of the negotiating 
120. Among many others, the University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law Center for Negotiation and Dispute Resolution exemplifies such a program. 
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relationships that engender value-creating agreements and sustaina-
ble partnerships. And yet where emotionality is viewed as opposi-
tional to analytical reason, demonstrating any of these emotions 
could undermine perceptions of the lawyer as a rational actor. If 
emotions suggest weakness, betraying trace emotionality could com-
promise perceptions of a negotiator's strength and integrity. How 
does the effective legal negotiator proceed? 
B. Consulting Emotional Data during a Negotiation 
Even when overt demonstrations of emotionality risk censure, a 
negotiator must nevertheless maintain and consult a constant 
stream of emotional sense data to keep the negotiation on track. The 
demands made on her emotional sense during her ongoing inner de-
liberation are squared when she negotiates with someone else (or 
raised to the power of however many other people are involved). Now 
the object of her emotionally-informed deliberation is not just to eval-
uate input and elect a response, but to maintain the targeted rapport 
with the other emotionally-reactive individuals while adjusting for 
their own changing emotional postures and preferences. 12 1 
Accordingly, monitoring the interpersonal progress of a negotia-
tion is a ritualized courtship of action, evah~ation, and reaction that 
engages the negotiator in parsing out and reinforcing actions that im-
pact favorably (or otherwise accomplish the intended result) while 
avoiding behaviors that seem to alienate (or otherwise impede the 
intended result). After all, in forging productive negotiating relation-
ships, having good intentions is not enough - said intentions must 
also be perceived as such by the other party.l22 The negotiator relies 
on emotional sense to divine how best to cooperate in a joint commu-
nicative enterprise that must take account of another's emotional 
sense and sensibilities. She must decide how to deploy appropriate 
emotional cues to ease progress along, and how to respond appropri-
ately to emotional cues deployed by the other party. She must evalu-
ate the other party's tolerance or demand for overt expressions of 
emotionality and find an appropriate balance with her own. She 
must critically evaluate incoming affective data to discern dishon-
esty, and guard against emotional exploitation by an opportunistic 
adversary. And, she must figure out how to accomplish all of this 
121. Emotional preferences are discussed further below at Part IV.D. 
122. See DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: How TO DISCUSS 
WHAT MATTERS MosT 44-57 (1999) (discussing the frequent disjuncture between an 
actor's intention and the actual impact of his behavior on another). 
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while maintaining an appropriate presentation of what she and/or 
her negotiating partners consider "professionalism." 
To take three examples: 
Scenario One: The Longstanding Attorney and In-State Special-
ist. Suppose you and I are preparing together for a trial that begins 
tomorrow. I am the longstanding, favorite attorney of my corporate 
client, who is litigating an alleged breach of contract out of state. I 
have been admitted pro hoc vice to continue working on the case, be-
cause the Board of Directors is concerned that the process remain 
informed by my detailed understanding of the client's interests. 
However, you are the in-state specialist that the Board has hired to 
navigate the case through unfamiliar state law. Our relationship is 
cordial, though we often differ in our interpretations and opinions 
about strategy. We have allocated spheres of responsibility, but we 
work to maintain coherence in our overall presentation. The usual 
tension mounts as opening arguments approach, but we are careful to 
maintain a working environment that values our various strengths 
and respects our differing perspectives. 
Scenario Two: The Junior Associate and the Partner. Alterna-
tively, suppose I am the junior associate and you are the partner 
working on the details of a merger. You prefer to work relatively in-
dependently, but require my close collaboration because you are over-
whelmed with new deadlines after inheriting the caseload of a 
partner who has suffered a heart attack. Excited about the opportu-
nity to work with you at last, I hope to impress you with my skills 
while maintaining the distance you require to work efficiently. 
Scenario Three: The County Counsel and the Board of Supervi-
sors. Or, I am the County Counsel and you are the Director of the 
County Board of Supervisors. We are in closed session with the rest 
of the Board discussing a controversial plan to rezone agricultural 
areas for commercial use, which has drawn serious protest from the 
community. We have been arguing heatedly over the matter, and two 
Board members have already walked out. 
In these contexts, negotiating the interactive affective currents 
becomes a dance of bilaterally looped emotional sense: I act - per-
haps it is a speech act, perhaps an initiative taken - and look for 
what you seem to think about what I meant by that action, and then I 
try to gauge how you feel about your conclusions regarding my inten-
tions. (As the longstanding attorney in the first scenario, I wonder: 
Did you see my statement as conveying respect? But did that strike 
you as inappropriately obsequious?) The source materials for my 
judgments arise from both analytical and emotional input. I may 
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evaluate your reaction based on the affective data of the trace emo-
tional signals that you convey by your expression, posture, or tone of 
voice, which I understand based on an empathetic consultation of my 
own emotional database of experience. (As the junior associate in the 
second scenario, I consider: Does your distracted tone reflect dissat-
isfaction with my work, concern for your colleague, or anxiety that 
your lifestyle may lead to a similar result?) 
Based on these calculations, I decide what should constitute my 
next act. (As County Counsel in the third scenario, I wonder: Should 
I take a more assertive approach? Retire to regroup?) I may elect 
this act based on a cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives, subject to 
a risk analysis of your potential responses in light of my partial infor-
mation about your interests and my subjective judgments about your 
feelings. (If I am too aggressive, I may risk dismissal by triggering 
your pride, though I believe you probably value my services more 
than your pride under the circumstances ... ) Alternatively, I may 
react in anger or respond in a nurturing way so quickly that it ap-
pears instinctive, through a decisionmaking process unmediated by 
purely analytical thinking. Or both. Meanwhile, you are simultane-
ously engaged in a complementary process. 
Compared to the relatively inconspicuous emotionally-informed 
Deliberation Beneath, the quality of deliberation I rely on in these 
circumstances is more conscious, and more directly enmeshed with 
other forms of inductive and deductive reasoning. (And compared to 
the subtle emotional inferences at play in individual deliberation, the 
emotional content of the Negotiation Beneath corresponds more 
closely to our conventional understanding of emotional states.) But 
the core insights I draw on in evaluating and responding to negotiat-
ing stimuli remain the individually-deliberated epistemological prod-
ucts of emotional-sense. On both ends of the ritual, affective data is 
the currency of the exchange. We can never know for sure what the 
other party actually experiences; we have only our marriage of emo-
tional sense and analysis to guide our judgment. Even when 
presented with verbal testimonial about the other party's experience, 
we unfailingly test that information against what our emotional 
sense tells us is true (often recognized, in this context, as 
"intuition"123). 
Lacking well-honed, fine-tuned emotional sensibility, a negotia-
tor could neither establish nor evaluate rapport with other parties, 
perceive exploitation, or take remedial steps at breakdown. Without 
123. See infra Part IV.F. 
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effective dialogue between our separate emotional senses, it would be 
extremely difficult to reach the hallowed "wise agreement" that Roger 
Fisher and William Ury first encouraged negotiators to seek.124 
However, the skills required for establishing such a dialogue can be 
learned, and the better negotiators learn to identify the emotional 
preferences of their partners and calibrate a comfortable and efficient 
emotional exchange - call it a "wise emotional dialogue" - by which 
the parties quietly shepherd the substantive negotiation toward 
resolution. 
C. Establishing a Wise Emotional Dialogue 
Whereas the looped consultation of emotional data operates 
largely on emotional undercurrents, the wise emotional dialogue cre-
ates a forum for more overt emotional exchange in which negotiators 
deploy targeted emotional cues or directly broach emotional matters 
within the established boundaries of collective comfort. In a wise 
emotional dialogue, the negotiating parties encourage one another's 
collective orientation toward the goal and discourage opportunistic 
emotional manipulation. Ideally, a successful emotional dialogue en-
genders the good will that enables parties to efficiently navigate 
roadblocks, uncertainties, and outright conflicts by facilitating re-
spectful listening and empathetic consideration of opposing interests. 
But the emotional dialogue also provides a forum to communicate ef-
fectively about disappointments or problems arising in the negotia-
tion. Creating an environment that respects participants' varying 
sensibilities allows the negotiators to learn, through the exchange, 
that which is needed to reach agreement. 
Finding the contours of a wise emotional dialogue requires sensi-
tivity to both the emotional preferences of negotiating partners and 
the immediate circumstances. As the longstanding attorney in Sce-
nario One, I may decide that our successful emotional dialogue 
makes it appropriate to smile and tell you earnestly how much I ap-
preciate your cooperative style. As the junior associate in Scenario 
Two, I may facilitate an effective emotional dialogue by avoiding di-
rect reference to the grief I presume you feel but do not wish to dis-
cuss, while signaling my supportive intentions through body-
language, tone of voice, and prompt performance of assigned tasks. 
As the County Counsel in Scenario Three, I may work toward the 
establishment of a healthier emotional dialogue by defusing tension 
124. See generally FrsHER, URY & PATrON, supra note 25. 
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following the two board members' walkout, perhaps by acknowledg-
ing the feelings of frustration I perceive among the remaining board 
members and affording them an opportunity to be heard before pro-
ceeding further. 
But when one board member seeks to dominate by intimidation, 
I may work to preserve the emerging dialogue by respectfully (or, if 
need be, aggressively) reasserting control over the meeting. Every 
wise emotional dialogue may look different; the wisdom is in the 
achievement of a forum that advances the substantive goal by ad-
dressing the needs of the negotiation within the acceptable emotional 
parameters of the participants. Wise negotiators set forth appropri-
ate affective cues at the appropriate times, and when combating such 
emotional manipulation as intimidation, the appropriate cue may be 
one that conveys courage, resolution, or displeasure. 
Nevertheless, the cultivation within a dialogue of emotionally 
positive motivational cues, such as excitement or optimism, may 
prove the most effective lubricants for the critical negotiating process 
of brainstorming opportunities for creating value in agreements. 125 
Hope, both expressed and experienced, encourages negotiators to 
press forward even when the substance of a negotiation appears in-
auspicious.l26 Acknowledging that "the role of emotion or feeling, ei-
ther positive or negative, remains one of the least studied areas of 
negotiation," Professors Max Bazerman and Martha Neale neverthe-
less advise that negotiators can improve their outcomes and exper-
iences by cultivating positive emotionality during the negotiation.127 
They explain that negotiators can 
begin to understand the impact of emotion on negotiation by 
considering what is known about the benefits of positive feelings 
or good humor. Psychologist Alice !sen and her colleagues have 
found that positive emotion is associated with greater generos-
ity and helpfulness. It also enhances how much you like other 
people, improves your view of human nature, and your creative 
problem-solving ability, and lessens your aggressiveness and 
hostility.128 
They report on studies showing that negotiators who began in a good 
mood (induced, for example, by a gift) are able to reach more creative, 
125. Cf. MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 121-
22 (1992). 
126. Cf. id. 
127. BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 125, at 122. 
128. Id. at 122. 
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optimal agreements employing fewer competitive or contentious tac-
tics.129 Thus, a wise emotional negotiator recognizes the value not 
only of encouraging positive emotions in her negotiating partner, but 
in herself. 
The wise communication of ambition, curiosity, surprise, toler-
ance, adamance, or disappointment can also align cooperation or oth-
erwise contribute to the course of an effective negotiation. Even 
unintentional displays of emotion- including those that may cause 
discomfort - can prove useful in the quest for an optimal agreement, 
because they may convey missing data about interests at hand. The 
most useful data from such an unintentional emotional moment is 
often yielded to the emoting party herself, enabling re-evaluation of 
her own established and/or previously unrecognized interests - per-
haps, as Professor Nozick suggests, by conveying a palpable repre-
sentation of value (positive or negative) implied by a particular 
alternative. 13° For example, a tort plaintiff who reacts angrily to a 
proposed settlement that offers full monetary compensation with a 
nondisclosure agreement may learn (and his attorney should recog-
nize) that his interests in public acknowledgment and/or remedial 
changes by the defendant are as important as his need for financial 
redress. 
As much as emotionally-derived wisdom can benefit a negotia-
tion, lawyers must also be wary of the real ways that poorly-managed 
or exploitative emotionality can endanger a negotiation and use the 
emotional dialogue as a forum to address such problems. As Profes-
sor Fisher notes, 
In a negotiation, particularly in a bitter dispute, feelings may be 
more important than talk. The parties may be more ready for 
battle than for cooperatively working out a solution to a common 
problem. People often come to a negotiation realizing that the 
stakes are high and feeling threatened. Emotions on one side 
will generate emotions on the other. Fear may breed anger, and 
anger, fear. Emotions may quickly bring a negotiation to an im-
passe or an end_l31 
To the extent that expressions of emotion tend to self-replicate, rela-
tionships can be harmed, hope lost, creativity stifled, and good faith 
extinguished when negative emotionality is let loose in a negotiation. 
If one party criticizes another of bad faith or lacking abilities, the 
accused is likely to become equally unsatisfied with the process. 
129. !d. 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96. 
131. FISHER, URY & PATTON supra note 25, at 29. 
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Emotional error132 can also harm a negotiation's progress if a ne-
gotiator responds to affective data in a way that strikes others as dis-
proportionate. When an emotional reaction is surprising, wise 
negotiators will seek to learn what it is that underlies the unexpected 
response in order to determine whether it is actually erroneous, po-
tentially manipulative, or may signify a previously underappreciated 
interest (as for the angry tort plaintiff). The wise negotiator uses her 
emotional sense to coax others back to the table when emotional error 
interrupts a negotiation in which coinciding interests dictate a 
favorable resolution. Moreover, she must resist the interference of 
personal error by monitoring her emotional responses and evaluating 
them against all other available data about the situation. Of course, 
if people could do this consistently, then emotional error would cease 
to exist. But awareness of the potential for error combined with the 
exercise of individual will to constrain it offers a level of human 
surge-protection wholly unavailable to the emotionally unwise. 
Ideally, a prepared negotiator can anticipate scenarios that 
might trigger a destabilizing emotional response and carefully craft 
his presentation to avoid the trigger or alleviate the underlying sensi-
tivity. For example, the longstanding attorney and in-state specialist 
from the first scenario cultivate an environment that minimizes com-
petition by assigning tasks and stressing the contributions each has 
to offer. The junior associate assisting the overworked partner proba-
bly avoids reference to heart attacks. The County Counsel carefully 
navigates the idiosyncratic hot-buttons he knows about when di-
recting comments to the various members of the Board and recom-
mends an open meeting to stem public sentiment that the Board is 
operating unaccountably. 
However, a wise negotiator surprised by an unanticipated break-
through of negative emotion must deliberate carefully to select the 
best alternative. Perhaps the emotional demonstration is useful, and 
the information conveyed by the emotion can be harnessed toward 
building a more stable outcome that better cares for the neglected 
interest behind the sore emotional response. For example, the tort 
lawyer whose client reacts angrily to the non-disclosure proposal133 
can learn whether he is angry because he wants public acknowledge-
ment or because he wants assurances that the same fate will not be-
fall someone else, and renegotiate the settlement accordingly. The 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. 
133. See supra pp. 44-45. 
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surprised negotiator can also seek to palliate a neglected interest di-
rectly, where possible, by empathizing or relationship repairing (for 
example, demonstrating as County Counsel that no disrespect was 
intended to the offended Board members who walked out of the meet-
ing). Alternatively, a surprising response may signal to the emotion-
ally-informed observer that further negotiations should be postponed 
or discontinued entirely. 
Finally, wise negotiators must guard against the predatory de-
ployment of emotionality by others. Opportunistic parties may con-
spire to mislead or exploit the emotional sensitivity of others. 
Emotions may be strategically manipulated for distributional gain: 
sympathy exploited, anger fanned, or fear stoked. Even positive emo-
tions may leave a negotiator vulnerable, as it has been suggested that 
overly happy negotiators may be more susceptible to certain cognitive 
biases that lead them to form suboptimal agreements that insuffi-
ciently satisfy their interests. 134 For example, a flattered customer 
may be overly pliant while negotiating terms. An eager party may 
close negotiations too early, leaving value on the table or failing to 
address contingencies that threaten implementation. A negotiator 
misled into a state of deep but unwarranted gratitude may agree to 
suboptimal terms because she feels a false pull of reciprocity. 
Under conditions of uncertainty about the intentions of other 
parties, trusting emotional sense can leave a party fearing vulnera-
bility to exploitation. It may seem safer to shut down the flow of emo-
tional data (or drive it back underground), even if doing so yields an 
agreement farther from the Pareto frontier than might have been 
achieved through more efficient emotional exchange. It is this very 
fear of exploitation that underlies two of the primary tensions that 
Professor Robert Mnookin has identified in negotiation: the tension 
between empathy and assertiveness and that between creating and 
distributing value. 135 But a wise emotional negotiator must also bal-
ance the tension between harnessing emotional exchange to advance 
the progress of a negotiation and suppressing it defensively as 
necessary. 
134. See BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 125, at 122 (noting that happy or content 
negotiators may be more susceptible to framing, escalation of commitment, and avail-
ability effects). 
135. See MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 9-10. 
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D. Managing the Fourth Tension 
Professor Mnookin identifies the three primary tensions with 
which a negotiator contends as those between value-creation and dis-
tribution, empathy and assertiveness, and principal and agent. 13 6 
But in addition to the primary tensions, a negotiator must also bal-
ance the competing demands of functional emotionality within each 
specific negotiating environment, constituting a Fourth Tension of 
negotiation. 
Establishing a wise emotional dialogue necessitates that parties 
maintain an uncertain equipoise between the competing pitfalls of 
overly conveying and overly concealing emotionality while consulting 
emotional data, deploying intentional cues, monitoring for error, de-
fending against manipulation, and navigating the unique emotional 
styles of the other negotiators. Every smile, every grimace, every de-
cision to rebuke and every spoonful of swallowed pride represents a 
chosen point along the continuum charted by the Fourth Tension. 
The emotionally wise negotiator manages this tension by skillful 
application ofhis own emotional resources. A wise decision to give or 
to guard emotional impulses implicates individual emotional prefer-
ences as much as it does the overall negotiating goals, and it must be 
made pursuant to the most carefully informed deliberation. It goes 
without saying that parties must learn to control the interference of 
unintentionally apparent negativity in strained negotiations and un-
wisely apparent positivity where it conveys information that strategi-
cally would best remain private. Less obvious, but equally 
important, is the necessity of balancing the positive and negative im-
pacts of otherwise productive emotionality in a negotiation between 
parties of differing emotional styles. 
While this balance must be achieved in any negotiation, it be-
comes especially important in cross-cultural negotiations - broadly 
defined to include negotiations between different ethnic cultures, dif-
ferent genders, different age groups, and even members of different 
family groups that exhibit unique preferences regarding the expres-
sion and contemplation of emotionality. Of course, individual styles 
between similarly situated group members may also depart so dra-
matically as to match this level of difference, and the fact that negoti-
ators may not be on the lookout for cultural-level style differences in 
such cases can make these negotiations especially fraught. But antic-
ipated cultural differences provide negotiators a more foreseeable 
challenge in navigating the fourth tension. 
136. ld. 
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For example, cultural groups harbor different tolerances for em-
barrassment. No one likes to be humiliated, but certain cultural 
groups will (at least stereotypically) go to greater lengths than others 
to protect the dignity of all parties from affront. As such, American 
lawyers must learn the art of "saving face" to negotiate successfully 
with parties from China and other Asian cultures in which the emo-
tional offense taken at dignitary harms could undermine an other-
wise productive exchange. At the same time, they must consult 
emotional sense to ascertain whether their particular negotiating 
partners are responding in a manner consistent with the cultural 
stereotype, or whether the affective data indicates that a different 
approach is warranted. 
Sometimes emotional sensitivity is all that can save an exchange 
gone awry in light of other cross-cultural misfires. In one anecdotal 
example of a failed opportunity, an Irish-American friend traveled in 
a region of the Irish countryside where people customarily nod their 
heads when they are confused by what you are telling them, in order 
to signal their desire that you explain better what it is you mean. My 
friend faced no language barrier, looked similar to his hosts, and was 
fairly knowledgeable about other core elements of the culture. How-
ever, as an American, he generally nodded his head in agreement to 
encourage the speaker or to signal that he was following what he was 
being told. Soon into his visit, he wondered why the people were so 
redundant. Not long afterward, they seemed not only tiresome, but 
just plain tired. This was also a community for whom expressing 
frustration was considered rude, so the hosts were extremely reluc-
tant to tell the visitor outright how exhausting he was becoming to 
them. The American failed to see (until it was too late) even the sub-
tle emotional cues that might have helped him discover what he was 
missing that might have helped him salvage rapport. 
To the extent that parties are culturally unaccustomed to overt 
emotional expression, even positive expressions of emotion can prove 
- if disproportionate to prevailing cultural norms - threatening to a 
negotiation. Conversely, if a negotiation stalls after one party looks 
in vain for signs of cooperation or good will in the poker face of an-
other, the latter may need to push beyond the limits of her emotional 
comfort zone to satisfy the former's more pressing need for emotional 
reassurance. Among certain company, tears of joy at the table might 
seal the deal; in others it might threaten to destabilize the negotia-
tion. The wise negotiator must evaluate and experiment with the 
proper quality of emotional exchange in each situation, or risk negoti-
ation impasse. 
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E. Intuition, Cognitive Bias, and Emotional Sense 
All negotiators manage the fourth tension at varying levels of 
consciousness, but we seldom acknowledge the debt of these manage-
ment choices to emotional sense. At most, we consider it an "intui-
tive" skill, without recognizing that intuition is, in fact, a 
sophisticated process of synthesizing affective .data. It may be that 
the concept of "intuition" seems less threatening a participant in the 
realm of deliberation than irrationality-equated "emotion," but we 
are hard-pressed to explain intuition, while emotional sense provides 
at least some mechanisms suitable for discussion. Perhaps the more 
"rational" approach in legal education would be to scrutinize more 
closely the influence of emotional factors that we can, at least partly, 
explain. 
For example, the law students to whom I have taught negotia-
tion were frequently perplexed by how much credence they should 
give to (what they called) intuition. To them, intuition represented 
an inner-direction toward a preferred course of action arising from 
something other than logical analysis. Each of them had experienced 
intuitive direction at some point in their negotiating experience, but 
the more they learned about negotiating skills, the more uncomforta-
ble they became "just going with their intuition." In the educational 
setting in which they had been presented with rule-like admonitions 
("separate the people from the problem"137) and orderly formulas 
("one, negotiate the process; two, identify interests; three, explore 
value-creating trades ... "138), giving credence to emotionally-derived 
information would have threatened the intellectual integrity of their 
legal training. And yet each of them had felt compelled to make one 
or more negotiating decisions that they could not trace to information 
yielded by a particular exchange of ideas or some other obvious basis. 
The students had somehow come to trust an intuition about the 
given odds, the veracity of their negotiating partner, or even the po-
tential for recognizing unseen future benefits. These "intuitions" 
arose from somewhere, but they weren't sure where, and the naked-
ness of the uncertainty made them uncomfortable. "If I can't explain 
it," they reasoned, "I should probably just stick to the formulae." But 
pressed, they trusted intuition again and again, creating cognitive 
dissonance for them about the value of their training. 
137. See FISHER, URY & PATrON, supra note 25, at 17. 
138. Checklist approaches like this are advanced in such foundational instruc-
tional texts as Fisher's GETI'ING TO YEs (supra, note 25) and Shell's BARGAINING FOR 
ADVANTAGE (supra, note 12). 
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Often, the mysterious source of the "intuition" was the inductive 
but unconscious processing of affective data - the epistemological op-
eration of emotional sense. The process can be so fast, and so facile, 
that it can be easy to miss what is happening, or even how we might 
exert control over it (like the way we forget about breathing, though, 
if we focus on it, we can elect to breathe more deeply or slowly, or 
hold our breath until it hurts). Legal education would be better 
served by crediting what part of the mystery of judgment we can un-
derstand, by teaching the concept, care, and feeding of emotional 
sense. This could be taught by introducing the process of emotional 
epistemology in the same way we teach negotiators to understand the 
influence of such barriers to negotiation commonly identified as "cog-
nitive biases," including reactive devaluation, risk and loss aversions, 
and naive realism. 
In fact, these very cognitive biases may be better understood 
with reference to emotional sense. Reactive devaluation describes 
the tendency for a negotiating party to devalue a concession from the 
other side simply because it is offered by an adversary- even where 
persuasive (or objective) evidence suggests the concession holds 
greater value than the party perceives.139 For example, a concession 
withheld seems more valuable than one on the table, and an offer to 
settle for what had seemed the ideal amount just yesterday may seem 
suspiciously low once offered. 140 Reactive devaluation is clearly an 
irrational phenomenon (since the objective value of the settlement is 
the same in either scenario), and it can often be understood as emo-
tional error resulting from distrust of an adversary. Cultivating bet-
ter emotional literacy among lawyers might help disputants avoid 
the inefficiencies that reactive devaluation can cause in a negotiating 
process. 
Similarly, naive realism is the powerful cognitive bias that de-
scribes people's tendency to assume that they see the world exactly as 
it is (unmediated by personal biases), and that other reasonable peo-
ple will thus come to the same conclusions they do (the "false consen-
sus" presumption).141 N alve realism, a nearly universal bias that 
fuels discord between spouses and superpowers alike, can be cured by 
139. See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to 
the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHio S. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 246-47 (1993) (explaining 
risk aversion, loss aversion, and reactive devaluation). 
140. !d. 
141. See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Nai"ve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications 
for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 110-11 
(Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996). (explaining na'ive realism). 
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the conscientious practice of empathy - the exercise of imagining the 
situation through the unique lens of another's experience - an emo-
tionally-informed epistemological skill. 
People's consistent demonstration of risk and loss aversions fur-
ther indicate emotionally-mediated analysis. Risk aversion predicts 
that most negotiators will not gamble for a potential gain, even 
though the potential gain is considered more economically valuable 
than the expected value of not taking the risk. For example, offered a 
choice between (1) a sure gain of $20 or (2) a 25 percent chance of 
gaining $100 and a 75 percent chance of gaining nothing, vastly more 
test subjects will choose the sure gain ($20), even though the "ex-
pected value" of the gamble (25% x $100 = $25) is slightly higher.142 
The economist would argue that, under neutral circumstances, the 
probability-adjusted potential for gain renders the gamble the eco-
nomically superior choice. And yet the overwhelming majority choose 
the smaller expected value, every time.143 Is economics a false sci-
ence? Surely not. But the simple "expected value" model does not 
account for the full calculus of human decisionmaking, which also 
takes account of such emotional inputs as the sense of well-being or 
pleasure that most attach to knowledge of a secure outcome144 or the 
reluctance to risk the experience of shame and disappointment that 
would accompany the gamble 75 percent of the time. 
However, even as risk aversion demonstrates that people are 
hesitant to gamble for a potential gain when it puts a smaller, sure 
gain at risk, loss aversion tells us that most people will gamble to 
avoid a potential loss, even if losing the gamble implies a greater 
loss.l45 Thus, the same test subjects who would avoid the gamble for 
the extra $80 in the first example would prefer the risk if the gamble 
was between losing $20 for certain and testing the odds of a 25 per-
cent chance oflosing $100 and a 75 percent chance oflosing nothing. 
As explained by Professor Mnookin, 146 say you want to leave a room 
and you have two options. Those exiting through the front door must 
pay $20. Three out of four who exit through the back door leave for 
free, but one out of four must pay $100. Which way do you leave? 
According to researchers, if you are like most people, you'll chance 
the rear door. 
142. See Mnookin, supra note 139, at 243-45. 
143. Id. at 244. 
144. The minority in this experiment are considered "risk-seekers," for whom the 
thrill of the gamble outweighs the pleasure in security. 
145. See Mnookin, supra note 139, at 244. 
146. Id. (proposing the following thought-experiment to illustrate loss aversion). 
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Loss aversion suggests an intriguing paradox because whether 
something is seen as a potential gain or loss often depends heavily on 
how the situation is framed for the perceiver. For example, settling 
litigation for $100,000 rather than going to trial may strike a loss 
avoiding defendant as a loss that she might prefer to avoid by gam-
bling on a favorable jury verdict - unless her emotionally savvy law-
yer frames the settlement as an opportunity to hold onto the more 
compelling $900,000 that she currently possesses but could lose as 
the result of a negative judgment and sunk litigation fees. 
Although the economist would evaluate the expected value ratios 
in the above-described risk and loss aversion scenarios as economi-
cally equivalent, it is significant that apparently rational people con-
sistently treat them differently. Nevertheless, the fact that their 
preferences are not predicted by "expected value" does not mean that 
people are behaving irrationally; indeed, the very predictability with 
which people defy the expectation suggests a human logic that the 
economic model somehow misses. Loss aversion indicates that people 
attach some emotional value to having something, and that the nega-
tive emotional experience of losing something one already has tips 
the decisionmaking scale in a way that not getting something that 
one has never had does not. 
Notably, the conservative tendencies encouraged by this "bird-in-
the-hand" preference would seem to facilitate survival under condi-
tions of scarcity. This insight, combined with the suggestion that the 
preference appears virtually hard-wired in most people, suggests that 
there may even be a strategically selected-for, biological basis forcer-
tain wisdom that we apprehend through the emotional experience of 
wanting security. And in fact, neurobiologists are finding evidence 
that emotionality does serve important survival-oriented purposes. 
F. Emotional Epistemology and Neurobiology 
Attributing to emotional sense its due in cognition should in no 
way diminish reasoning as the other defining human characteristic. 
As often as our behavior may wax similarly impulsive, our canine and 
feline friends have not comparably mastered the art of delayed grati-
fication. And yet, that human beings share with dogs and cats cer-
tain emotional responses to the world is to be expected in light of the 
shared origins of mammalian brains. Indeed, new insights from 
neurobiology underscore the value of emotionally-informed wisdom 
by shedding light on the "pre-rational" mechanism of emotional influ-
ence on mammalian, and especially human, response. 
Spring 2005] The Discourse Beneath 279 
In recent years, researchers have isolated the primary role of the 
amygdala, an almond-shaped mass of gray matter near the base of 
the brain, in orchestrating human responses via such emotional and 
motivational cues as fear or attachment. In the past, scientists be-
lieved that all emotional reactions to sensory experiences involved 
the cerebral cortex, where logical thought is processed. However, 
new research indicates that some nerve pathways convey signals di-
rectly from the ear to the amygdala, where sympathetic and para-
sympathetic decisions about behavior are rendered with emotional 
significance but without cortical involvement - like the release of 
adrenaline, increasing the heart rate and preparing the muscles for 
response.147 Although such revelations certainly impact the ongoing 
philosophical mind-body debate that we have agreed to leave alone 
here, they also inform our discussion by indicating the adaptive value 
of emotional inputs to effective decisionmaking. 
For example, neurobehaviorist Dr. R. Joseph has found that neu-
rons located in the amygdala serve to monitor and abstract from the 
cluttering array of sensory stimuli certain information of "motiva-
tional significance," which assists in organization of the appropriate 
response. For human beings, this organized process results in the 
experience and expression of appropriate feelings and behaviors.148 
As Dr. Joseph explains, 
This includes the ability to discern and express even subtle so-
cial-emotional nuances such as friendliness, fear, affection, dis-
trust, anger, etc .... Moreover, some neurons located in the 
amygdala are responsive to faces and facial emotions conveyed 
by others. Many neurons are also able to respond to visual, tac-
tual, olfactory, and auditory stimuli simultaneously.149 
In other words, through the amygdala, we are hard-wired to take 
mental account of affective data about our ongoing interaction with 
the immediate environment that may bypass our centers of language-
mediated, analytical thought entirely. Just as our ancestors did in 
the harsh proving grounds that selected for this trait, we will per-
ceive and respond simultaneously to various streams of sensory and 
emotional data in a negotiating environment that may never see the 
light of deductive logic. Our negotiating partners will perceive and 
147. See National Institute of Mental Health, Basic Behavioral Science Research 
for Mental Health, NIH Publication No. 96-3682, 1995; Ralph Adolphs et al., Fear and 
the Human Amygdala, 15 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 5879 (1995). 
148. "Limbic System," The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, Academic Press, 
Inc., 1994, available at http://www.europe.apnet.com/inscight/10301996/amygd2.htm 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2005). 
149. Id. 
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respond emotionally to the data that we communicate just as 
automatically. 
Research into the role of the amygdala in converting environ-
mental stimuli into human action suggests that our use of emotional 
sense in mediating world experiences is a matter not only of good 
negotiating judgment but of basic evolutionary biology. The develop-
ment of an emotional sense organ in a section of the brain distant 
from the neocortex affirms that emotionality is not a mere subset of 
rational thought, nor an aberration of the analytical process, but an 
independent source of human knowledge that has helped to ensure 
the very survival of the species. Informed by affective data straight 
from the limbic system, emotional sense thus forms an elegant bridge 
between the things we know more with our bodies, like the sense of 
taste, and the things we know primarily with our minds, like common 
sense. 
The lesson should not be that rational thought should give way 
to raw, evolutionarily prior emotional response- but instead that we 
are creatures fortunate enough to receive and respond to stimuli 
gathered by (at least) two different parts of our brains, for different 
reasons. Rather than pretending that there is only one, or insisting 
that only one of them matters, deliberators should focus attention on 
improving the capacity to harness the value of each, and in their syn-
thesis, find wisdom. 
G. Emotional Intelligence and the Competitive Market for 
Negotiators: Recommendations for Legal Education 
That the Negotiation Beneath already takes place in every nego-
tiation does not mean that it cannot benefit from improvement 
through conscious intervention. This is especially so for most law-
yers, whose education not only ill-prepares them for dealing with 
emotionality in their work, but actively stunts their development of 
emotional sensibility.l50 The concept of "emotional intelligence" 
tracks some of the important features ofwell-honed emotional sense, 
and the legal profession has been cited as one whose practitioners 
often match higher-than-average analytical intelligence with lower-
than-average emotional intelligence. 15 1 
To this end, some argue that lawyers are facing a serious compet-
itive disadvantage now that clients increasingly expect more emo-
tionally sensitive, client-centered legal care and nonlawyer 
150. See supra Part II. 
151. See, e.g., Richard, supra note 26. 
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practitioners with better emotional skills may soon be authorized to 
provide it.152 Lawrence Richard, a trained lawyer and psychologist 
who consults to law firms on management and organizational behav-
ior, warns that lawyers who do not become more emotionally compe-
tent will not survive in the new legal marketplace.153 In a 1999 legal 
column urging that law firms consider emotional intelligence in hir-
ing decisions, he wrote: 
[J]ust last week an ABA committee recommended doing away 
with the restriction on nonlawyers from practicing. Within two 
years, we will see a very different legal landscape. [Nonlawyer 
practitioners] will be commonplace in the U.S. legal market-
place. You can't afford to wait until then, because by then, com-
peting providers of legal services will already have had a 
significant head start in cultivating emotional intelligence 
among their professionals."154 
Richard cites research suggesting that "the cognitive factors we al-
ways valued in the legal profession," cited as academic intelligence, 
work experience, and competence in a particular practice area, "sim-
ply do not predict success."155 Rather, he explains: 
The research suggests that these three factors taken together 
only account for a third of the factors that predict who is going 
to be successful, while the emotional intelligence or EQ factors 
predict the other two thirds. And as you climb the ladder of re-
sponsibility, EQ increases in importance. Among leaders, such 
as CEOs of companies and managing partners or practice group 
leaders in firms, it has been estimated that EQ factors for more 
than 90 percent of one's success.156 
Richard appears to define success according to the traditional indica-
tors of financial prosperity, professional esteem, and client loyalty. It 
is significant that even by the traditional yardsticks of legal practice, 
emotional competence proves critical. Law schools and Bar Associa-
tions should take note and mandate negotiation training, including 
emotional sense training, for all law students and in continuing legal 
education requirements. 
In an effort to improve interpersonal skills among students of ne-
gotiation, Professor Don Peters researched interpersonal style differ-
ences that they must overcome in establishing the learning exchange 
that characterizes effective negotiation. Exploring the impacts of 
152. See id. at 28. 
153. Id. 
154. Richard, supra note 26, at 28. 
155. ld. 
156. Id. 
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personality characteristics first identified by psychologist Carl Jung 
and indexed in the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator157 (including intro-
vert/extrovert, sensing/intuitive, judging/perceiving, and thinking/ 
feeling tendencies), he found that different pairings of these personal-
ity tendencies result in unique problem-solving scenarios, each with 
identifiable patterns of progress and breakdown.158 
Based on his results, Peters urges that students of negotiation 
locate their own style tendencies and study what these common traits 
can tell them about their personal negotiating preferences and how 
they tend to interact with the varying styles of others. This way, stu-
dents can "connect their habitual action patterns to ineffective conse-
quences"159 that result from them, and develop effective strategies 
for monitoring and modifying them as needed. 160 Similar work may 
be useful to help lawyers and law students discover their specific 
emotional preferences and identify their common consequences in ne-
gotiation, so that they can develop corresponding plans of corrective 
action. 
Equally needed is closer attention to how the demands on emo-
tional sense change in the various contexts in which lawyers practice. 
Although this piece addresses the most basic forms of deliberation by 
individuals and in groups, it would be useful to better understand 
how the demands on lawyers' emotional sense change when they are 
acting as litigators, mediators, judges, advisors, legislators, and more 
formal negotiators. Lawyers must manage the fourth tension in each 
of these contexts, but it would stand to reason that the balance is 
achieved along very different points of the continuum. 
For example, a lawyer might press toward more open discussion 
of emotional content in establishing the tenor of emotional dialogue 
for a mediation, especially if addressing emotional concerns appears 
necessary for full resolution of the dispute. A trial litigator may need 
to keep an especially close reign on her internal emotional impulses 
while working in an especially combative interpersonal environment. 
Legislators likely assume different emotional postures when they are 
working with constituents and when they are working with other 
157. See Don Peters, Forever Jung: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs 
Type Indicator and Learning Negotiations, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 1, n.1 (1993). ("Jung's 
typology creates a specific method for careful observation of similarities and differ-
ences found in common behavioral patterns of individuals ... [t)he Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator ("MBTI") is a psychometric instrument designed to make Jung's theory of 
psychological types· accessible and useful."). 
158. Peters, supra note 157. 
159. ld. at 107. 
160. See id. at 107-13. 
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lawmakers, but it may be appropriate that they rely more heavily on 
emotionally inductive reasoning in their task of representing others 
than do judges, who are called upon to perform the most deductive of 
all legal tasks in applying the rules oflaw. However, even judges rely 
on emotional sense in the epistemological manner described here in 
filtering the experiences with which they are presented through 
those established rules. 
Most needed, however, is curricular reform in law schools and 
continuing legal education to address the critical neglect of emotional 
resource development in lawyers. Lawyers and their clients would 
all benefit by greater attention to the cultivation of emotional sense 
by legal education, to fortify both individual and collective delibera-
tion among lawyers, jurists, and policymakers. Lawyers trained to 
understand the role of emotion in cognition will be empowered with a 
fuller panoply of resources in deliberative problem-solving, enabling 
them to produce more cogent analyses, navigate tricky interpersonal 
terrain, and better resist the effects of emotion-induced judgment 
errors. 
Perhaps the best model for such education comes from the inter-
personal skills training programs already in place at some law school 
negotiation programs, like those at Harvard, Stanford, University of 
Missouri-Columbia, University of California-Hastings, University of 
Illinois-Urbana Champagne, and Washington University, which em-
phasize improved self-learning, self-monitoring, listening, and mind-
fulness in negotiation through facilitated small group workshops and 
reflective writing assignments.161 Emotionally-informed negotiation 
can be taught through the carefully crafted simulations and negotiat-
ing exercises already in use in such programs, and materials could be 
modified to help students identify emotional inputs to the inductive 
reasoning that underlies both deliberation and negotiation. Given 
the critical role that lawyers play in society, we owe society no less. 
v. CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE EMOTION-REASON 
DuALISTic OPPOSITION 
Because courts view the law as fundamentally dispassionate and 
competing adjudicative processes such as the lynch mob as 
highly emotional, courts have often concluded that lack of emo-
tion is an essential attribute of justice. I call this the myth of 
dispassion because it rests upon two fictions: (1) that emotion 
161. See generally Bruce Patton, On Teaching Negotiation, in TEACHING NEGOTIA-
TION: IDEAS AND INNOVATION 7 (Michael Wheeler ed., PON Books 2000). 
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necessarily leads to injustice, and (2) that a just decisionmaker is 
necessarily a dispassionate one. 
-Samuel H. Pillsbury162 
Thus, beneath the surface of every negotiation - whether be-
tween siblings or heads of state - runs a current of raw and agile 
emotionality, continuously bridging the gaps between actions and in-
tentions, filtering otherwise arbitrary symbols through the charged 
gateway of meaning. To recognize the force of emotional inputs on 
legal decisionmaking is to deeply rattle the hegemony of rationality, 
quarantined from emotionality, as the exclusively legitimate media-
tor of deliberative human experience. But it is also to highlight the 
opportunities for deliberative progress and improvement. 
Lawyers are particularly vulnerable to the illusory emotion-rea-
son dualistic opposition in light of the emotionally pejorative intellec-
tual history of western legal culture. But even so, it has long been 
recognized that effective lawyering relies on the skillful appeal to 
emotional sense. As former President of the American Bar Associa-
tion John Shepard has noted: 
Advocates follow a long line of philosophers, theologians, writ-
ers, and thinkers who have debated the question of whether 
there is a conflict between emotion and reason. Whatever the 
outcome ofthis profound debate, successful lawyers have always 
understood that their power of persuasion depends upon a meld-
ing of the heart and the mind.163 
Wherever a pressing problem is to be solved, a wise agreement 
reached, or a valuable deal consummated, lawyers must establish a 
wise, if subterranean, emotional dialogue to complement their invo-
cation of rational persuasion. A failure to appreciate the impact of 
the emotionally-charged data exchanged in a negotiation risks the 
miscommunication and misjudgment that leads to avoidable ineffi-
ciencies. Moreover, the failure to heed one's own emotional responses 
to incoming data, may deny the negotiator important information that 
properly bears on a choice between alternatives. But as with any 
learned skill, the cultivated synthesis between a negotiator's rational 
and emotional resources improves with greater focus and 
understanding. 
Thus, negotiators in general - and lawyers in particular -should 
make greater effort to master the emotional vocabulary of human in-
teraction and deliberation. In personal deliberation, we should heed 
162. Pillsbury, supra note 7, at 666. 
163. Shepherd & Cherrick, supra note 90, at 629. 
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the ways in which affective data influences our legal judgment, and 
learn to consult it optimally while avoiding the distorting effects of 
emotional error. In settings of negotiation, we should seek to more 
consciously appreciate the emotional cues that we receive from nego-
tiating partners, to improve negotiation efficiency, forestall impasse, 
and avoid exploitation. We should more consciously monitor the emo-
tional cues that we send to avoid misunderstandings and encourage 
the kind of rapport that leads to optimal negotiating outcomes. 
Finally, we should become as familiar with the stages and ele-
ments of the Negotiation Beneath as we have become with the Nego-
tiation Above, so that we can shepherd the process as productively as 
possible. Just as Getting to Yes first road-mapped the stages and 
methods of negotiation that had previously seemed mysterious and 
impossible to explain (in other than "instinctive" terms), so should we 
define the stages, outline the goals, and explore the corrective mecha-
nisms involved in cultivating the wise emotional dialogue. 
In so doing, our goal should not be to privilege emotional sense 
over rational thought in the way that rational thought has always 
dominated, but instead to develop a more advanced synthesis of these 
two genuine media of human knowledge. Exclusive reliance on either 
medium, quarantined from the other, robs the deliberator of her ful-
lest potential for problem-solving. By acknowledging the salience of 
wise emotionality in individual and collective deliberation, lawyers 
will not only improve their own personal repertoires, but propel the 
practice oflaw, negotiation, and policymaking toward new horizons of 
efficacy. 
